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On 14 November 2016, the Mw 7.8 Kaikōura earthquake caused widespread damage along 
the east coast of the South Island, New Zealand.  Kaikōura town itself was isolated from the 
rest of the country by landslides blocking off major roads.  While impacts from the Kaikōura 
earthquake on large, urban population centres have been generally well documented, this 
thesis aims to fill gaps in academic knowledge regarding small rural towns. This thesis 
investigates what, where and when critical infrastructure and lifeline service disruption 
occurred following the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake in a selection of small towns, and how the 
communities in these areas adapted to disruption.  Following a robust review of literature 
and news media, four small rural towns were selected from North Canterbury (Culverden & 
Waiau) and Marlborough (Seddon & Ward) in the South Island, New Zealand.  Semi-
structured interview sessions with a special focus on these towns were held with 
infrastructure managers, emergency response and recovery officials, and organisation 
leaders with experience or expertise in the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake.  Findings were 
supplemented with emergency management situation reports to produce hazard maps and 
infrastructure exposure maps.  A more detailed analysis was conducted for Waiau involving 
interdependence analyses and a level of service timeline for select lifeline services.  The 
earthquake impacted roads by blocking them with landslides, debris and surface rupture.  
Bridges where shaken off their abutments, breaking infrastructure links such as fibre 
landlines as they went.   Water supplies and other forms of infrastructure relied heavily on 
the level of service of roads, as rough rural terrain left few alternatives.  Adapting to an 
artificial loss of road service, some Waiau locals created their own detour around a road 
cordon in order to get home to family and farms.  Performance of dwellings was tied to 
socioeconomic factors as much as proximity to the epicentre.  Farmers who lost water 
access pulled out fences to allow stock to drink from rivers.  Socioeconomic differences 
between farmland and township residents also contributed to resilience variations between 
the towns assessed in this study.  Understanding how small rural towns respond and adapt 
to disaster allows emergency management officials and policy to be well informed and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
On 14 November 2016, a Mw 7.8 earthquake occurred 95 km north-east of Christchurch (11 
km south of Waiau) and 15 km deep (GeoNet, 2016).  This earthquake was the latest in a 
series of high-profile earthquakes to hit the Canterbury and Marlborough regions within the 
previous decade (Table 1.1).  This includes the 2010 Darfield and 2011 Christchurch 
earthquakes which caused severe damage in the city of Christchurch, displacing thousands 
(Newell, et al., 2012).  One distinguishing aspect of the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake from 
these two events in particular is that it occurred relatively far from densely populated areas.  
The small, rural settlements and coastal towns in North Canterbury and South Marlborough 
experienced substantial physical damage and social and economic impacts.  The physical 
damage was dramatic with arterial roads buried in landslides (Villeneuve, et al., 2017), 
critical infrastructure severed by fault rupture (GeoNet, 2016), hundreds of structures 
moderately to severely damaged by ground shaking (Dizhur, et al., 2017), and coastal 
displacement of up to 6.5 m in places due to uplift (GeoNet, 2016).  The Kaikōura 
earthquake comprised of a complex rupture pattern, activating a series of faults, which 
ruptured in a northeast direction over time (Bradley, et al., 2017). 
 
 
Table 1.1: Recent earthquakes affecting the study area 
 
The purpose of this Master of Science project is to investigate what, where and when critical 
infrastructure and lifeline service disruption occurred following the Kaikōura earthquake in a 
selection of small towns, and how the communities in these areas adapted to disruption.  As 
Common Name Date Magnitude (Mw) Depth (km) 





2011 Christchurch Earthquake 21 February 2011 6.2 5.4 
2013 Seddon Earthquake 21 July 2013 6.5 15.6 
2013 Lake Grassmere Earthquake 16 August 2013 6.5 7.5 





New Zealand is prone to a range of extreme natural hazard events, the information 
gathered will help inform resilience measures for future periods of service disruption in 
rural and remote areas.  Our research into four small rural towns (Figure 1.1) is guided by 
these key objectives: 
- Document the critical infrastructure impacts on small towns in North Canterbury and 
Marlborough 
- Examine anticipated and actual adaptations to lifeline service disruption 
- Assess the success of these adaptations, and consider the implications of future 









1.2 Risk Management 
1.2.1 Sendai Framework 
The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction is a global disaster resilience plan 
endorsed by The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR).  As 
a voluntary, non-binding 15-year plan, UN member countries may sign and follow the 
agreement to prevent new and reduce existing disaster risk (UNISDR, 2015).  This is 
accomplished through a multidisciplinary, integrated approach (UNISDR, 2015).  New 
Zealand is a signatory to the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, which has 
informed Civil Defence and Emergency Management’s (CDEM) 2015 National Plan and is 
guiding the development of the National Disaster Resilience Strategy - in turn regulating risk 
reduction and resilience measures at a regional level (New Zealand Government, 2015).  
This project closely aligns with the four Priorities for Action proposed in the Sendai 
Framework by:  
1. Assisting to understand disaster risk by reviewing where, when and how critical 
infrastructure was damaged or services were disrupted.  
2. Strengthening disaster risk governance by communicating our findings with local 
government and CDEM administration.  
3. Identifying targets for active investment in disaster risk reduction for resilience by 
investigating key infrastructure failures.  
4. Enhancing future disaster preparedness and recovery rehabilitation and 
reconstruction through the knowledge gained from literature and interviews with 
affected communities (UNISDR, 2015).   
 
Several conceptual models have been produced to describe the relationships between 
natural hazards and risk.  The exact equations and definitions differ between various 
authors (UNISDR, 2017; Koks, et al., 2015), however the core principle tends to remain the 
same.  For this project we adopt the equation used by the United Nations International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR).  Their concept is as follows:  
(H x V x E) / R = Dr 
Where H is the Hazard itself, V is the Vulnerability of a community and E is Exposure of a 
community to the hazard.  These three inputs amplify one another, however if any value is 
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zero then the value for Dr, Disaster Risk, is also zero.  Unlike Koks, et al. (2015), UNISDRs 
equation adds the input R for Resilience, which acts as a mitigating factor on H, V and E.  
Resilience includes such things as an educated and aware populace, sensible building codes 
and the physical ability to respond to disasters (UNISDR, 2017). We consider R as we will be 
investigating adaptations made by the community, a form of resilience.  
 
1.2.2 Hazard Management 
Hazard impact assessments are crucial to efficient policymaking.  Impact analyses improve 
crisis management through empowering decision-makers in resilience planning, by 
presenting accurate, up to date information on hazard consequences (Laugé, et al., 2013).  
These consequences mainly fall into social (Maguire & Cartwright, 2008), health, economic 
and environmental spheres (Hinrichs, et al., 2011), which may be assessed individually or 
holistically as required (Laugé, et al., 2013).  The latter may be further separated into natural 
and built environments where applicable (Hinrichs, et al., 2011).   
  
Earthquakes may generate a number of primary and secondary hazards.  Primary hazards 
are intrinsic to the initial event, while secondary hazards are generated by the interaction of 
primary hazards with infrastructure and the environment (Marano, et al., 2010).  For 
example, a primary hazard such as ground-shaking can trigger the secondary hazard of 
landslides through interaction with steep, unstable and/or saturated slopes in the 
environment.  Varying earthquake magnitudes and shaking intensities, environmental 
conditions and human exposure can result in inconsistent generation of hazards between 
events, and some hazards may not develop at all given certain geographical and 
environmental conditions (Marano, et al., 2010).  Reported primary and secondary hazards 
of the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake will be addressed later in this review. 
 
1.2.3 Acceptable Risk and ‘ALARP’ 
Zero risk is impossible (Rovins, et al., 2015).  Acceptable risk is defined as potential losses a 
community considers acceptable and is governed by societal norms, politics, economics and 
physical barriers to resilience (Rovins, et al., 2015).  This incompletely describes risk 
entertained by a community, which falls under tolerable risk (Rovins, et al., 2015).  
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Intolerable or unacceptable risk is outside the consent of a community altogether (Rovins, 
et al., 2015).  
 
As Low As Reasonably Possible/Practicable (ALARP) refers to risk which is as low as 
practically feasible, a risk reduction threshold entities are ethically responsible for reaching 
(Parkes, 2017).  This principle is also way of justifying tolerable risk under practical 
circumstances, as it recognises that beyond a certain point further risk reduction is 
increasingly costly (Jones-Lee & Aven, 2011).  The investment of time and resources can 
become disproportionate to the risk negated when risk is sufficiently reduced (Jones-Lee & 
Aven, 2011).  There is no worldwide standard for tolerable risk limits, which themselves vary 
by risk context (Parkes, 2017).  This exacerbates differences in perception of risk between 
the public and even different levels of required hazard management, and was demonstrated 




Figure 1.2: Acceptable, Tolerable and Intolerable Risk with ALARP threshold.  Adapted from Sofyalloglu et al., 2017. 
 
1(Figure 1.2) Acceptable, Tolerable and Intolerable Risk with ALARP threshold.  Adapted from Sofyalloglu et al., 2017. 
 
Figure 1.3: Visualisation of earthquake hazards applicable to the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake contex2(Figure 1.2) Acceptable, 
Tolerable and Intolerable Risk with ALARP threshold.  Adapted from Sofyalloglu et al., 2017. 
6 
 
1.2.4 Prioritisation of Lifelines 
It is the responsibility of MCDEM (Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management) and 
CDEM groups to identify and resolve emerging conflicts in the prioritisation of restoring 
disrupted lifeline services as part of their coordination efforts (MCDEM, 2015).   The service 
disruptions themselves are triaged according to a scale ranging from local, to regional, to 
national significance.   A disruption of local significance would fall under the jurisdiction of a 
single territorial authority and CDEM Group (MCDEM, 2015).  Where two or more territorial 
authorities are affected, the situation is upgraded to regional significance (MCDEM, 2015).  
The Civil Defence Emergency Management Act (2002) defines national significance as 
involving any 
• Widespread public concern or interest 
• Likely significant use of resources 
• Jurisdiction of two or more CDEM groups 
• Likely impact on New Zealand’s international obligations 
• Likely involvement of technologies, processes or methods new to New Zealand 
• Likely to result in or contribute to significant or irreversible changes to the 
environment, both domestic and global. 
Some organisations prefer a population-based approach to critical infrastructure and lifeline 
service significance, where set thresholds of affected individuals determine ranking 
(Canterbury Lifeline Utilites Group, 2018), however this is difficult to estimate accurately in 
remote rural localities and is not what is supported in legislation (CDEM Act, 2002).  This is 
because seasonal and year to year numbers for tourism and itinerant workers are constantly 
fluctuating.  Raw population estimates also struggle to take into account population density 
and remoteness (Gerald, 2016), further complicating this.  It is possible for disruptions of 
local or regional significance to inherit higher classifications based on the interdependency 
of services and infrastructure.  For example, the failure of powerlines along an isthmus may 
be traditionally considered as locally significant if it occurs within a single territorial 
authority.  However if these particular lines were responsible for powering a water 
treatment facility, which is considered of national significance, the powerlines inherit the 
significance of the water treatment facility (MCDEM, 2015).   Such scenarios have 
intersectional importance with many communities in the South Island of New Zealand 
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where local infrastructure failure can have repercussions on regional and national scales.  
Following this logic, localised adaptations to service disruption may also have the potential 
to impact other communities.   
 
1.3 Small towns and critical infrastructure 
Small towns face a number of challenges specific to their population size.  Low populations 
generally result in a limited tax base and low reinvestment within the local community, 
restricting funds for the upkeep of local infrastructure (Howard, 2015).  Self-sufficiency is 
more difficult for geographically remote1 towns than for major population centres.  This is 
because the economics often do not justify maintaining infrastructure to facilities or 
networks that cater to only a few remote households, especially over difficult terrain 
(Gerald, 2016; Howard, 2015).  Facilities that people take for granted in larger population 
centres, such as supermarkets and schools, are more sparsely distributed in low population 
density regions (Gerald, 2016).  In many cases, small towns in high-income countries are 
progressively affected by stagnant or declining populations which puts further strain on the 
ability for local government to fund the ever-increasing costs of infrastructure maintenance 
and restoration (Wood, 2017; Howard, 2015), particularly with comparatively high 
population growth rates in cities.  For example, Ruapehu District in the central North Island 
of New Zealand, recently reported it must source >NZ$1 million for a new water treatment 
plant that services only 9,000 people (Wilson, et al., 2017).   We therefore see 
interdependence forming between small communities, or satellite settlements that rely on a 
larger nexus. This may result in long commutes for goods and services, which become 
lengthier should local options be disrupted (Gerald, 2016).  The concept of 
interdependencies between communities like this is of interest as it highlights the 
importance of restoring specific service routes, such as road blockages isolating one 
community from another with a supermarket. 
 
                                                     
1 We clarify our definitions of the terms remote and isolated as follows because the use of the words is often 
inconsistent in literature (Gerald, 2016; New Zealand Government, 2015):  We refer to isolated communities as 
those that have been disconnected or separated from other communities or administration through the 
disruption of infrastructure, services or lifeline utilities.  Examples of disruption include landslides blocking 
main roads and electricity failure from power lines broken by severe ground shaking.  We refer to remote 
communities as those that are distant or physically difficult to access. 
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Lifeline utilities are defined by CDEM as entities and operators that provide essential lifeline 
services, such as transport, water, power and communications (Waikato Lifeline Utilities 
Group, 2017).  These are supported by physical critical infrastructure which includes roads, 
water pipes, power lines and cell towers.  The vulnerability of critical infrastructure is 
therefore of considerable interest to disaster resilience planners.  As discussed previously, 
small town infrastructure is considered to be more vulnerable to hazards as there is less 
money available for regular maintenance and development (Gerald, 2016).  This situation is 
exacerbated in remote localities, where access to maintain and repair infrastructure may 
not be ideal.  Population size, therefore, will be an important filter in our selection of study 
sites.  Compounding issues of low population and the rugged terrain of New Zealand 
increases costs to maintain and develop infrastructure (NIU, 2015) – further limiting options 
for redundancies.  Public and administrative awareness of critical infrastructure has 
implications for adaptability and disaster resilience (Giovinazzi, et al., 2017; GNS Science, 
2013), which is another aspect to be explored.  A diverse range of primary industries are 
important employers for people living in rural areas (Stats NZ, n.d. a). 
 
1.4 Kaikōura Earthquake 
The 2016 Kaikōura earthquake triggered several primary and secondary hazards (GeoNet, 
2016).  Primary hazards included shaking and surface rupture, which developed landslides, 
liquefaction and tsunami (Figure 1.3).   In Chapter 3 I discuss the particular impacts these 









1.4.1.1 Strong Ground Motion 
As arguably the most well-known primary hazard of earthquakes, the effects of ground 
shaking sit at the forefront of urban damage investigation.  Bradley et al. (2017) gives 
specific attention to near-source shaking during the earthquake, which saw ground motion 
exceeding 1.0g horizontally and 2.7g vertically in one location.  Ground motion was 
strongest in and around the Kaikōura District (Bradley, et al., 2017). 
 
1.4.1.2 Surface Rupture  
More than 30 km of surface rupture has been observed in satellite imagery, with up to 12 m 
of strike-slip displacement (Hollingsworth, et al., 2017).  Surface rupturing has the potential 
for serious infrastructure disruption (Hollingsworth, et al., 2017), as seen with segments of 
road and railway which suffered from severe deformation (Figure 1.4)(NCTIR, 2017a).   
 
Figure 1.4: Papatea Fault surface rupture across SH1 (Stirling et al., 2017). 
 
3(Figure 1.4) Papatea Fault surface rupture across SH1 (Stirling et al., 2017). 
 
4(Figure 1.4) Papatea Fault surface rupture across SH1 (Stirling et al., 2017). 
 
5(Figure 1.4) Papatea Fault surface rupture across SH1 (Stirling et al., 2017). 
 
Figure 1.5: Landslide blocking SH1 and pushing Main North Line train tracks off the railroad (Steve Murrin, 2016).Figure 1.4: 
Papatea Fault surface rupture across SH1 (Stirling et al., 2017). 
 
6(Figure 1.4) Papatea Fault surface rupture across SH1 (Stirling et al., 2017). 
 




Shaking also triggered tens of thousands of landslides in the Canterbury and Marlborough 
regions, covering roads and rail (Davies, et al., 2017; Massey & Dellow, 2017; NCTIR, 2017b; 
Villeneuve, et al., 2017).  Figure 1.5 depicts one of many such landslides along SH1, which 
was strong enough to push train tracks from the foot of the cliff, across the road onto the 
beach.  Landslides along rivers were also common, with many creating earth dams (Little, 
2016).  Large volumes of water would build up behind them until structural failure releases 
flash flooding into the river valley.  As of February 2019, seismogenic landslide totals are still 
being tallied, through such techniques as satellite imagery analysis, fieldwork and aerial 
photography investigation (Rosser, et al., 2017).  
 
1.4.1.4 Liquefaction 
Liquefaction damage from the Kaikōura earthquake was low, relative to the 2011 
Canterbury earthquakes.  This is largely due to the hilly, draining geomorphology of the 
North Canterbury and Marlborough regions (Smith, 2016).  Although liquefaction was 
Figure 1.5: Landslide blocking SH1 and pushing Main North Line train tracks off the railroad (Steve Murrin, 2016). 
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uncommon within the study area, damage to the reclaimed land of Wellington centreport 
was significant (Cubrinovski, et al., 2017). 
 
1.4.1.5 Tsunami 
The tsunami accompanying the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake was generated under unusual 
conditions.  The earthquake began on land and propagated offshore – activating multiple 
faults along the sea floor (Bai, et al., 2017).  Before the complex nature of the earthquake 
was uncovered, it was assumed from the initial epicentre reports that it was sufficiently 
inland to not cause a tsunami (Borrero & Lane, 2018) and a ‘National Advisory: No Tsunami 
Threat’ message was issued 38 minutes after the earthquake (MCDEM, 2017a).  Just as this 
message was issued tide gauges observed a sudden drop in sea level consistent with 
tsunami generation and a ‘National Warning: Tsunami Threat’ was issued 20 minutes later 
(MCDEM, 2017a).  Bai, et al. (2017) used computer modelling to simulate the contribution 
these faults may have on tsunami generation, finding that two regions of seafloor motion 
produced the tsunami.  The tsunami left a ~4 m crest-to-trough signal at Kaikōura (Bai, et al., 
2017) and a run-up as high as 6.9 m at Goose Bay, south of Kaikōura (Power, et al., 2017).  
As the tsunami arrived at the shoreline around mid to low tide, the damage was minimal 
(GeoNet, 2016).   
 
1.4.1.6 Evacuations 
Exposure to human life was also minimised due to widespread self-evacuation following the 
earthquake (GeoNet, 2017).  Some of this self-evacuation was excessive however, as people 
several kilometres outside of evacuation zones congested roads leading out of coastal 
communities (Schoenfeld, 2018).  Substantial confusion over whether or not to evacuate 
arose out of inconsistencies between MCDEM and local CDEM messages – when MCDEM 
gave instruction to evacuate, local CDEM would not activate tsunami warning sirens in many 
cases (Schoenfeld, 2018).  
 
1.4.1.7 Rain events 
Multiple heavy rain events occurred in November and December 2016 following the 
earthquake, further activating landslides and washing away loosened topsoil.  These 
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environmental impacts were most evident in the Marlborough Sounds.  Heavy rain 
continues to be an issue for erosion management along the cliff face overlooking SH1. 
 
1.4.2 Social Considerations 
Damage to property, lessened financial security and threat to physical health each play an 
important role in generating and maintaining emotional trauma among the victims of 
disaster, and underdeveloped regions are particularly underequipped to cope (Norris, et al., 
2002).  As there was considerable variation in circumstance, there was also considerable 
variation in individual and social responses to the 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake (Gluckman, 
2016).  Sir Gluckman (2016) outlines a four-phase general framework to describe the 
changing psychosocial needs of a community over time following a disaster: 
 
1) An altruistic phase immediately following the event, where people typically do not 
“count the costs” and will elect to see to the needs of others despite the impact to 
themselves. 
2) An optimistic phase as help begins to arrive, and a general feeling of improvement is 
fostered. 
3) A phase of disillusionment, where the realities of logistics interfere with emergency 
relief and recovery.  The length of this phase is variable depending on feelings of 
empowerment, community resilience and access to aid.   
4) A new equilibrium, where people adapt to the long-term reality of the disaster 
aftermath.  This phase has no clear end and may last for years, if not indefinitely.  It 
is typically characterised by a return to a pattern of “everyday life”.  It is important to 
acknowledge that uncertainty around the potential for future events will negatively 
affect recovery, and that relocation does not suddenly solve misgivings for those 
impacted by disaster. 
 
It is the responsibility of local District Health Boards (DHB) to manage mental health, 
however this is not a simple task in the best of circumstances, let alone in remote rural 
communities (Gluckman, 2016).  Several helplines that cater to rural mental wellbeing have 
been set up in the wake of the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake, as well as local support groups 
(Cook, 2016).  Research suggests that most people recover from disaster-induced trauma in 
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the long term, however at least 5 % will need ongoing professional assistance (Gluckman, 
2016).  The assignment of community navigators allows for both feedback to the DHB 
regarding needs as well as improving resident access to critical services (MCDEM, 
n.d.)(Section 3.5.4). 
 
As part of an assessment of research priorities for this event, it was found through 
workshops that some people affected by the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake object to it being 
named as such (Hatton, et al., 2017).  Hatton, et al. (2017) explain that this is due to 
perceived social and economic impacts to naming a disaster after a place.  Participants in 
workshops echoed this point, citing disenfranchisement that Kaikōura township “seemed to 
be getting all the attention”, when infrastructure damage was widespread across North 
Canterbury and Marlborough (Canterbury Lifeline Utilites Group, 2018).  Despite this, the 
label given to this event has already been firmly accepted in international literature, and for 
this reason the name “2016 Kaikōura earthquake” will continue to be used throughout this 
thesis.  It should be noted that all sensitivity was exercised in the interviews for this thesis, 
and alternative naming conventions were used in person and in correspondence when 
appropriate. 
 
1.4.3 Known Adaptations 
As it took some time to restore services disrupted by the earthquake, community members 
needed to adapt their lifestyles, businesses and remaining infrastructure to overcome new 
hurdles in everyday life.  Much of this came in the form of sharing labour and resources.   
 
The isolation of Waiau by slips and road damage spurred farmers to assist one another and 
provide reassurance, as well as switching to gas barbecues in the absence of power (Stuff, 
2016).  It took some time before authorities restored water in urban areas of Waiau, 
however personal drinking water was not an issue for many farmers as rainwater storage 
tanks are the norm (Stuff, 2016).  Although watering stock became an issue after a few days 
(ECan, 2016), personal water storage improved resilience for the farmers and their families 
(Stuff, 2016).  ECan (2016) was one source informing farmers that they had the option to 
use fenced-off waterways for watering stock very soon after the earthquake.  Following the 
Christchurch earthquakes, dairy farmers in Waiau also shared milking facilities to make up 
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for damaged infrastructure (Stuff, 2016).  This was not as widespread following the Kaikōura 
Earthquake, where guidelines for milk dumping needed to be circulated (ECan, 2016).  These 
points encouraged us to research Waiau further. 
 
1.5 Analogous Event Adaptations 
Social, economic and physical changes to daily life underpin community adaptations to 
lifeline service disruption.  Large earthquakes, such as the 2011 Christchurch earthquake, as 
well as other recent natural hazard events in New Zealand, including the 2006 Canterbury 
Snow Storm and 2008 Hurunui Floods, make good analogues for the Kaikōura earthquake 
with respect to community responses immediately following the event.  Each of these 
events severely interrupted lifeline services and the chain of emergency administration.   
 
1.5.1 2006 Canterbury Snowstorm 
The 2006 Canterbury Snowstorm was an event that brought extreme levels of snow across 
the Canterbury region.  As with the previously mentioned earthquakes, critical 
infrastructure supporting the electrical grid was severely damaged, leading to long term 
blackouts which consequently disrupted telecommunications in many places (Hendrikx, 
2006; Wilson, et al., 2009).  While direct livestock losses from the snowfall were minimal, 
the closure of roads and the failure of the electrical grid resulted in product and time 
wastage that did cause financial losses (Wilson, et al., 2009).   Many local businesses 
donated their time and lent equipment to help restore lifeline services in the region, and 
where telecommunications were available some businesses went as far as checking if 
regular clients needed assistance (Wilson, et al., 2009).  
 
1.5.2 2008 Hurunui Flooding 
In 2008 the Hurunui District, also located in Canterbury, was inundated by heavy flooding 
during a storm event (Wild, 2014).  Rivers overtopped their banks and covered roads and 
farmland in water (Wild, 2014).  NZD$850,000 was invested in flood protection measures as 
a form of long term adaptation, mitigating the risk of future events primarily by repairing 
the Dock Creek flood control gate and developing river diversion works (Hurunui District 
Council, 2010).  As data on historic flood events in the Hurunui District is limited, 
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comprehensive computer modelling of flood risk and impact has been a priority for regional 
government (Griffiths & Holmes, 2014; Wild, 2014). 
 
1.5.3 2011 Christchurch Earthquake 
While not strictly small towns, some outer suburbs of Christchurch encountered similar 
issues to remote towns when lifeline services were disrupted by the Mw 6.2 2011 
Christchurch earthquake.  Limited resources to restore infrastructure encouraged the 
formation of community volunteer groups, as well as regular meetings to facilitate events 
such as neighbourhood barbeques (GNS Science, 2013).  Pooling resources through such 
activities reduced the community- and family-level strain on material aid and aid workers, 
however the potency of this effect sharply declined with limited participation as the time 
following aftershocks grew (GNS Science, 2013).  The capacity of families to adapt appears 
to be tied to how well-prepared for an earthquake they are beforehand (GNS Science, 
2013).  Out of the respondents to a 2013 GNS Science survey in Christchurch only 28 % were 
prepared to CDEM standards of basic preparation, comprising of emergency plans and 
supplies, resulting in a slow initial community response to the disaster and a heavy reliance 
on outside resource distribution (GNS Science, 2013).   
 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is divided into five chapters as seen in Figure 1.6.  Chapter 1 (this chapter) is an 
introduction, providing context and background for the other chapters.  Chapter 2 contains 
the methodology of my investigation, including town selection and an interview framework.  
The two main content chapters that follow these conceptually form a letter ‘T’ shape – 
Chapter 3 is a broad view chapter looking across all four towns in my investigation and the 
‘bigger picture’ of emergency management whereas Chapter 4 makes a more detailed 
assessment focusing on just one of the case study towns (Waiau).  The majority of 
discussion takes place in Chapters 3 and 4, drawing heavily on original research from the 
interviews conducted as part of my investigation.  Chapter 5 is a concluding chapter, 
summarising the findings of this thesis with a focus on key impacts and adaptations.  It also 









Figure 1.6: Diagram outlining the structure of this thesis 
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
2.1 Research Focus and Chapter Overview 
This chapter describes the methodology used to accomplish our three focus objectives. The 
first objective is to document the critical infrastructure impacts on small towns in North 
Canterbury and Marlborough.  While impacts from the Kaikōura earthquake on large, urban 
population centres have been generally well documented, this thesis aims to fill gaps in 
academic knowledge regarding small rural towns.  Building on this, any anticipated or actual 
adaptations to disruptions in lifeline service are examined.  Such adaptations are recognised 
as a path to building resilience.  Finally, an assessment is made on the success of these 
adaptations, and implications of future changes to infrastructure and environment are 
considered.   
 
The chapter begins with an explanation of the town selection process, involving background 
research into various parameters of rural townships before being run through a selection 
matrix.  Hazard and infrastructure maps are produced at regional and district levels for 
contextualising the environment and circumstances of the four selected towns.  These are 
followed by an overview of the interview system used in this investigation. 
 
2.2 Town Selection 
2.2.1 Initial town selection 
In the given time frame and scope of this thesis, it was feasible to investigate four towns.   
The following criteria were chosen to produce an initial pool of towns from news media, 
from which in turn specific towns for further consideration could be selected: 
- The settlement is within the study area of North Canterbury, Kaikōura and 
Marlborough 








2.2.2 Matrix for Case Study Town Selection 
After identifying prospective towns it was necessary to choose the most appropriate for 
study (Figure 2.1).  The matrix we use employs a traffic light system as an initial assessment 
of how suitable communities are for more detailed investigation in the project.  This system 
has been adapted from the matrix used by the Resilience to Nature’s Challenges (RNC) Rural 
team to select case studies in their ‘Resilient Rural Backbone’ project.  The following key 
criteria (Table 2.1) were established after an initial examination of literature, including stage 
1 of the New Zealand Lifelines Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment, which directs the 
reader towards lifeline aspects considered significant in researching CDEM (New Zealand 
Lifelines Council, 2017).   
 
The hazard instances and impacts to infrastructure used in the matrix were primarily 
sourced from news media published online, through such reputable organisations as 
DairyNZ, Radio New Zealand, and The New Zealand Herald.  While not a factually exhaustive 
source, the intent of this news media-based data collection was to develop and refine an 
initial selection pool – highlighting areas to focus our research in greater depth.  This 
information was also used in identifying locally significant industries impacted by hazards.  
The types of co-seismic hazard indicated in this analysis are explored in greater detail in 
Chapter 1 of this thesis.    
 
Figure 2.1: Town selection steps. 
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Locally significant industries were confirmed in the selected towns by supporting council 
website descriptions and with classifications from the land cover database developed by 
Landcare Research.  A more direct approach may be to review economic statistics such as 
company asset reports. However, that data is not readily available in all cases and would not 
include a geospatial component, thus limiting our analysis. 
 
 
Table 2.1: Matrix criteria explanation. 
Criteria Explanation Assessment for Green 
The settlement is within the 
study area of North 
Canterbury, Kaikōura and 
Marlborough 
 
Our focus is on the 
communities directly affected 
by the 2016 Kaikōura 
earthquake within the North 
Canterbury and Marlborough 
regions  
The community is within the 
North Canterbury and 
Marlborough regions (all 
communities listed) 
The settlement is a small 
town 
Our focus is investigating 
small rural communities 
“Usual” population size <1000 
(this is the permanent 
residential population) 
The community has been 
reported to have been 
affected by the 2016 Kaikōura 
earthquake 
It is not feasible to investigate 
every community for hazard 
impacts on infrastructure, so 
we have drawn on literature, 
reports and news media to 
identify initial candidates 
The community has been 
reported to be affected in the 
mentioned documentation 
types (all communities listed) 
There is a variety of key 
earthquake hazards 
represented in/among the 
communities 
It would be valuable to 
compare perceived and actual 
risk between multiple 
earthquake hazards 
Multiple key earthquake 
hazards are represented 
20 
 
There is a variety of impacted 
infrastructure types 
represented in/among the 
communities 
It would be valuable to 
compare existing resilience to 
infrastructure damage and 
service disruption among 
many different infrastructure 
types.  This should also 
diversify the adaptations 
available for study 
Multiple infrastructure types 
are represented 
There is a variety of locally 
significant industries 
represented in/among the 
communities 
It would be valuable to 
compare the fragility and 
priorities of various industry 
sectors.  This should also 
diversify the adaptations 
available for study 
Multiple industry sectors are 
represented 
 
2.2.3 Case Study Town Selection Criteria 
Each community was assessed using the selection criteria outlined in Table 2.1, and the 
results are presented in Table 2.2.  Red boxes in Table 2.2 indicate that criteria have not 
been met, eliminating the community from detailed study in this thesis, while amber boxes 
suggest that criteria have been at least partially filled.  Fully satisfying a given criterion 
results in a green box.  The colours have been weighted numerically to assist in selection, 
where red is worth -12, amber 1 and green 2.  Red represents a negative value specifically to 
disqualify towns which exceed a maximum parameter.  Amber is a partial or poor fulfilment 
of conditions, whereas green is an optimum fulfilment of conditions.   
 
Towns which have exceeded the ‘usual’ population limit, a classification used by the New 
Zealand Census to describe permanent residential population, received a red rating for 
criterion 2 and have been eliminated from further study.  Census population data is 
preferred over unofficial or absent data sources.  Data on transient populations is 
notoriously difficult to quantify and is not available for most of the prospective 
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communities.  For this reason, only ‘usual’ populations are considered for the selection 







Table 2.2: Selection matrix.  Green is worth 2 points, amber is worth 1 point.  Red is worth -12 points to disqualify that community from selection.  Final scores accompanied by an asterix 












Rakautara Seddon Waiau Ward 
Within the 
study area 
             
Affected by 
earthquake 
             
‘Small’ 
community 











NO DATA NO DATA 
POOR 
DATA 
   
Variety of 
hazards 
             
Variety of 
infrastructure  
             
Variety of 
industry types 
             




A preliminary infrastructure exposure inventory, developed from both GIS tools and 
literature, was considered for Table 2.3 to guide our investigation and identify key elements.  
Where critical infrastructure is absent from the inventory, we can assume that either nearby 
communities host and share the services with the community in question – a form of 
interdependency – or that there is simply no data readily available.  A comprehensive 
exposure inventory (Chapter 3.2) was established with information gathered from 
interviews and workshops. 
 
 
Table 2.3: Table of selected towns with justification. 
Criteria Culverden  Seddon  Waiau Ward 
































Roads cut off 
Power outages 
 




Roads cut off 




























































2.3 Data sources 
2.3.1 Hazard Maps 
The hazard component of our equation for resilience varies widely across the study area for 
multiple hazard types.  Shaking severity is approximated here by Modified Mercalli Intensity 
(MMI), taken from Bradley et al. (2017).  It should be noted that the 2016 Kaikōura 
earthquake was unusual in that it propagated along a complex series of fault ruptures 
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All roads into 
Ward were cut 




points for other 
services such as 
fibre and power 
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These ruptured faults are depicted in red on Figures 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4.  Seismogenic landslides 
have been investigated by several studies at varying degrees of reliability and completeness 
(Sotiris, et al., 2016; Rosser, et al., 2017; Massey, et al., 2018), however we have chosen to 
apply the dataset from Massey, et al. (2018) here as it appears to have the most complete 
and accurate data within close proximity to our towns.  Geospatial datasets for surface 
rupture, lateral spreading and liquefaction have been difficult to source and for this reason, 




















































Figure 2.4: South Marlborough hazards 
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2.4 Infrastructure Inventory Maps 
Together with the previous hazard maps, infrastructure inventories offer geospatial context 
to hazard exposure – the E component of our resilience equation.  This consists of critical 
infrastructure networks, facilities, and components.  In this section we present critical 
infrastructure inventories for the overall study area (Figure 2.5) and partial district (Figures 
2.6 and 2.7) levels.  Smaller scale inventories for specific towns can be found in Section 3.2. 
 
The 2011 road network shapefile (TOPO 1:500) was taken from the Land Information New 
Zealand (LINZ) database.  State highways have been boldened to signify their class (Figure 
2.5).  As this data did not differentiate bridges from grounded roading, a separate bridge 
shapefile (TOPO 1:150k) was also sourced from LINZ and overlain on the road network.   
 
To represent the electrical network we have used the transmission infrastructure of 
Transpower, the state owned infrastructure manager for electricity transmission in New 
Zealand.  The nodal “sites” are undifferentiated from each other in the source file, however 
additional research showed these to be mainly grid exit points (GXPs).  Transmission lines 
take power from generator stations to GXPs, where it is then spread to consumers by a local 
distribution network at reduced voltages.  The distribution network that services much of 
Kaikōura and the Hurunui district was obtained for our analysis, however we do not have 
permission to republish it here.   At smaller scales we can cleanly display the location of 
critical facilities.  These include hospitals, schools and stations for the emergency services.  
Critical facilities were located with assistance from the Critchlow Emergency Management 
Basemap, Google Maps and input from interviewees.  These town-specific maps are found 











































Interview methodology for this project was approved by the New Zealand University of 
Canterbury Human Ethics Committee prior to engagement with participants. Interviews with 
infrastructure managers, emergency management officials and other experts were critical in 
gathering data for this project.  Situational reports, debriefs, media releases and previous 
research studies all focus on accomplishing set objectives in contexts different to our own.  
This leaves several gaps in the literature review that must be filled, clarified or expanded.  
Additionally, literature with distinct objectives can often cloud original context or reduce 
resolution of data to a point where details important to our investigation are overlooked.  
First-hand collection of data from interviews is thus extremely valuable. 
 
Before asking questions, we encouraged interviewees to recount their professional 
experience of the event.  This allowed the interviewee the opportunity to tell their story and 
provide context for our session.  We applied a semi structured style of interview with a few 
guiding questions to keep discussion relevant, customised to be appropriate for each 
interviewee. Some customisation was conducted before each interview and some occurred 
‘on the fly’ after hearing the experience during the interview.  A semi-structured approach 
was required to allow slight deviation from the interview structure to clarify certain points 
or follow a productive line of thought at times.   This had the additional intent to make 
discussions feel more natural and comfortable for all involved.  The stock guiding questions 
were as follows: 
- What were the impacts (failure and disruption) to critical infrastructure? 
- Where, when and why were critical infrastructure services affected? 
- Which critical infrastructure types are most vulnerable?  
- Which critical infrastructure types have the greatest perceived and actual effect on 
communities? 
- In which geographic and socioeconomic settings are communities more vulnerable to 
lifeline service disruption? 
- What specific disruptions are driving adaptation? 
- Where are disruptions occurring? 
- When are disruptions occurring? 
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- Where several lifeline services are disrupted, is there a hierarchy of service priorities?  
Does this match community needs? 
- What anticipated and actual adaptations do small communities make in response to 
critical infrastructure service disruption? 
- How successful are these adaptations?  
- Who directs or oversees adaptative behaviour? 
- What adaptation strategies exist to deal with critical infrastructure service disruption? 
- Were, where and when these strategies implemented, and to what success? 
- What went well, and what could be improved? 
- Any further comments on recovery in hindsight? 
- What current plans are there to improve resilience? 
 
We officially engaged with 15 participants across 12 sessions in organisation offices or 
neutral spaces such as cafes.  Participants were mostly district-level infrastructure 
managers, or involved in some other role that brought them into the response and recovery 
of one or more of the selected towns.  In order to preserve context and factual accuracy, 
audio recordings of each session were made if the interviewee consented. These recordings 
will not be made available for review to protect personally identifying information.  Assuring 
anonymity was important in this project so that information and opinions could be freely 
shared, especially content which had otherwise not been published in official reports.   In 
spite of this, organisation dominance and regional monopolies in industry make true 
anonymity difficult.  We have done our best to mitigate this by omitting identifying 
information where feasible, as declared in the approved University of Canterbury ethics 
application. 
 
Large printed copies of infrastructure inventory maps at different scales were brought to 
sessions as communication and memory aids.  By recording the position of certain 
infrastructure, hazards or events on the maps we gained unique insight and could 
incorporate these additions in successive iterations of electronic maps.  Revision and editing 
in the presence of experts ensures accuracy and helps to build a stronger picture of events 
for both interviewer and participant.  Additional materials such as datasets and images were 
obtained from some interviewees.   
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2.6 Interdependency Matrix 
The consequences of service disruption can be complex and far-reaching, impacting the 
ability of other services and even whole communities to function.  It is therefore valuable to 
include interdependencies in our analysis.  Interdependency matrices were developed 
based on examples given in the New Zealand Lifelines Council’s Lifelines Infrastructure 
Vulnerability Assessment.  These matrices represent lifeline interdependence criticality 
during business-as-usual and post-event, showing which lifelines services are most relied on 
by other lifelines in business-as-usual and post-event scenarios.  The values given are semi-








Chapter 3: Impacts and adaptations following the 
2016 Kaikōura earthquake in four small rural towns in 
North Canterbury and Marlborough 
 
3.1 Chapter overview 
Chapter three is the first of two chapters to present findings from original research, namely 
outputs from interview sessions with infrastructure managers and experienced members of 
other organisations involved in response, recovery and resilience.  This chapter analyses 
impacts and adaptations across the four case study towns selected in the previous chapter 
(Ward, Seddon, Waiau and Culverden) and any interactions between these towns following 
the Kaikōura earthquake.  We then evaluate the success of these adaptations.  The chapter 
begins with a brief background of each town and notes on the accompanying infrastructure 
inventories, before detailing characteristics on the built environment.  Much of the focus is 
on critical infrastructure, important facilities and the services they support.  This is followed 
by a section on socioeconomic response to the earthquake, involving such issues as 
transient populations, the ‘township vs producing land’ dynamic and socioeconomic barriers 
to developing resilience.  The final section reviews the governance of risk and resilience, 
specifically engagement with communities, legislation and the expansion of Marlborough 
District Council’s (MDC) remit to include the Clarence and Kekerengu river valley 
communities following the earthquake.  The bulk of the information presented in this 
chapter is drawn from the findings of the interviews described in Chapter 2. 
 
3.2 Background of Towns  
The four towns in our investigation are split between two districts to the north and south of 
Kaikōura.  Essential information regarding these towns can be found in Table 3.1. Culverden 
and Waiau lie in Hurunui district.  South east Marlborough harbours the towns of Seddon 
and Ward.  Coincidently, the towns in each pair are very close to one another – offering 
opportunities to observe co-dependence on infrastructure and socioeconomic links.  It 
should be noted population data for these towns is taken from the 2013 New Zealand 
Census, however the meshblocks used in classifying locales for the census may not match 
our study areas.  The boundaries of rural towns are not often clear without some sort of 
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geographical feature, such as bordering rivers or the ridges of a water catchment, which are 
incorporated for the study areas used in this thesis.  Additionally, population activity such as 
employment may expand the relevant study area of a town and is also considered here. 
  
Table 3.1: Case study towns.  For maps of these towns, see Figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4. 
 
Name Population Description 
Culverden 426 
(Stats NZ, n.d. b) 
A town in the Hurunui District of the North Canterbury 
region (Figure 3.1).  Considered the ‘hub’ of farming in 
the district, it is the commercial centre for many 
agricultural activities for Waiau and other localities in the 
Amuri Basin (Hurunui District Council, n.d. a).   
Waiau 261 
(Stats NZ, n.d. c) 
Waiau is located just north-east of Culverden within the 
Hurunui District in North Canterbury (Figure 3.2).  The 
township is involved in services which support large-
scale farming.   
Seddon 504 
(Stats NZ, n.d. d) 
Seddon is situated in the Marlborough District and region 
(Figure 3.3).  Major industries here include farming, lime 
quarrying and the Lake Grassmere salt ponds.  Seddon is 
located close to the epicentres of the previous 2013 
Seddon and 2013 Lake Grassmere earthquakes (Table 
1.1). 
Ward 930 
(Stats NZ, n.d. e) 
Ward is the second town we are investigating in the 
Marlborough District and region (Figure 3.4).  Pastoral 
farming and fisheries are the industries of greatest 
importance to the township.  One property on SH1 is 
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Figure 3.4: Ward Town Exposed Infrastructure. 
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3.3 Built Environment  
The built environment encompasses all the physical infrastructure in the study area.  For the 
purpose of this thesis this have been divided into two main categories, each with distinct 
geospatial characteristics: termed ‘critical infrastructure networks’ and ‘critical facilities’. 
Critical infrastructure networks incorporate a wide network of interconnected structures 
and spans, including roads, water schemes, electrical grids and telecommunications.  These 
connect the many remote communities of rural Marlborough and North Canterbury, 
however remoteness, terrain and low population has ensured that few redundancies in 
linear networks are economically feasible.  Critical facilities are distinguished here as 
individual pieces of infrastructure which are not inherently part of a larger network.  
Examples of this may include residences, schools, supermarkets and restaurants – all of 
which may rely on networked infrastructure such as the electrical grid to function, but are 
managed independently and provide a service unique from the networked infrastructure 
they rely on.  These should not be confused with nodes in infrastructure networks, such as 
GXPs, which still play a fundamental role in and rely on the rest of the electrical grid.  A 



















Table 3.2: Exposed Infrastructure Inventory for the case study towns 
 
3.3.1 Transport Networks 
3.3.1.1 Bridges and Roading 
Road jurisdictions in New Zealand are split between district councils looking after local 
roads, and central government maintaining state highways through the NZ Transport 
Agency.  The general workflow for restoring roading begins with highways, which form the 
backbone of overland transportation.  Some highways were unable to be restored in a 
timely manner due to significant landslides, such as along some coastal tracts of SH1.  The 
NZ Transport Agency together with KiwiRail and key transport contractors developed the 
North Canterbury Transport Infrastructure Recovery (NCTIR) alliance to spearhead the 
restoration of SH1 and the accompanying coastal railway.  Access along State Highway 1 was 
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blocked for more than a year following the earthquake, only reopening recently at a 
reduced capacity on the 15 December 2017 (NCTIR, 2017b).   
 
Marlborough and North Canterbury roads were severely disrupted by surface rupture, 
lateral spreading and landslides.  To a lesser extent liquefaction was also observed, however 
its impact on roads in Marlborough was negligible.  Surface rupture damage to roads in 
Marlborough was concentrated towards the mid to south.  Roads blocked by slips near 
Seddon were cleared by locals in early morning following the earthquake (15 November 
2016), speeding up response time for vehicles coming along SH1 through Seddon and Ward 
(Newton, 2016).  904 road bridges across Hurunui, Marlborough and Kaikōura districts were 
affected, however only two exceeded minor to moderate damage (Palermo, et al., 2017).  
Palermo, et al. (2017) primarily attributed this damage to ground shaking intensity. 
 
Fallen electrical conductors blocked many roads.  These were mostly removed within a 
couple of days by utility recovery personnel as part of electrical infrastructure recovery, 
however they represent a negative interaction between one type of infrastructure failure 
and disruptions in an otherwise independent lifeline service.  In Marlborough all roads were 
open in a driveable state within three days, excluding Awatere Valley Road which took nine 
weeks.  This road, west of Seddon, was infamously blocked by the landslide in Figure 3.5, 
isolating the Awatere Valley community by road.  Some road status information was initially 





The management and restoration of major roads is mostly left to local district councils, with 
the exception of certain routes such as the Inland Road which the NZ Transport Agency 
gained responsibility for due to its significance in accessing Kaikōura.  Once major roads are 
restored, minor roads are prioritised based on usage.  This standard system is modified 
based on the degree of road damage and the access needs of other critical infrastructure 
repair groups.  In Marlborough there was good communication in this respect as 
relationships had already been made following the Seddon/Grassmere earthquakes. 
 
An initial approach to slumping abutments and cracked roads was to reseal them, however 
continued slumping from aftershocks and ground settling made this inefficient compared to 
Figure 3.5: Awatere Valley Road blocked by landslide, excavator for scale (Steve Murrin, 2016). 
 
9(Figure 3.5) Awatere Valley Road blocked by landslide, excavator for scale (Steve Murrin, 2016). 
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Figure 3.6: Coverage of Brian FM radio broadcasts in Marlborough and North Canterbury.  Adapted from 
http://brianfm.com/Coverage-Map/Figure 3.5: Awatere Valley Road blocked by landslide, excavator for scale (Steve Murrin, 
2016). 
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simply covering roads with gravel as a temporary solution.  In one case, a set of abutments 
had been repaired as many as six times.  The Seddon earthquake had similar impacts on 
bridge abutments, so this lesson carried over for many people in Marlborough.  The gravel 
used in these roadworks was sourced locally from any of the numerous gravel bed rivers 
across the study area, notably the Waiau, Ure and Awatere rivers.  Environment Canterbury 
(ECan) sought to work closely with farmers on extracting gravel for repairing private roads 
and farm tracks, providing ‘gravel authorisation’ in order to better manage resources in 
North Canterbury (Environment Canterbury, 2018).  MDC issued similar gravel extraction 
consents for Marlborough.  Workers extracting gravel frequently reported concerns around 
the likelihood of landslide dams collapsing upstream, however these were being carefully 
managed by ECan with assistance from GNS Science.  A GIS-based system for tracking road 
status was adopted by MDC post recovery.  This ‘RAMM GIS’ would have been useful in 
coordinating with other lifeline infrastructure managers and feeding up to date, accurate 
information to authorities and public alike. 
 
3.3.1.2 Alternative Transport Modes 
Aircraft were used frequently immediately following the earthquake, to transport personnel 
such as politicians, tourists, infrastructure management crews, and news media. They were 
also used extensively in surveying and monitoring damage from the earthquake, particularly 
landslide dams and remote swathes of critical infrastructure networks.  Aviation fuel 
supplies in Marlborough became a concern very early on, as traditional overland transport 
routes along SH1 from Christchurch had been closed off and existing stockpiles were seeing 
increased usage.  This was initially relieved by transporting fuel from Nelson, however the 
SH63 alternative route eventually restored the supply from Christchurch.  Maritime and rail 
transport have been excluded from this analysis as there was little to no interaction 




3.3.2 Three Waters Networks 
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‘Three Waters’ consists of water supply, stormwater drainage and wastewater.  These 
systems were impacted to varying degrees across Marlborough and North Canterbury 
(Hughes, et al., 2017).  The 2013 Seddon earthquake had prompted the replacement of 
older water supply well systems for increased resilience, leading to generally greater 
survivability among these specific replacements (Hughes, et al., 2017).  Older storage tanks 
in the rural water supply networks of Ward and Seddon collapsed, although newer models 
performed well.  The connections between tanks and water pipes tended to suffer 
significant twisting and failure, even with modern AC piping and tanks while older brittle 
piping damage was largely localised to specific soil types (Hughes, et al., 2017).   Hughes, et 
al. (2017) identifies interfaces between structures (e.g., bridges, tanks) as vulnerable points 
in a modernised water supply network.   
 
During the 2013 Seddon and Lake Grassmere earthquakes, Seddon lost three potable water 
tank farms and after the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake, readings from these electronically 
monitored tank farms suggested that they were empty.  Onsite teams soon discovered that 
the tanks themselves were intact, however they had been thrown off their fittings by half a 
metre, which required significant repairs.  Most mains breaks were repaired within two days 
by a company contracted to manage the Seddon water supply, although it took between a 
week and ten days to fully repair all water mains breaks.   A notable pattern arising in 
wastewater systems in the 2013 Seddon earthquake is that pipes running east-west suffered 
damage while those running north-south were relatively unscathed.  This pattern was not 
recognised following the 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake (Hughes, et al., 2017).  Residents boiled 
water from the town supply to avoid possible contamination (Marlborough District Council, 
2017) 
 
Seddon wastewater uses asbestos cement (AC) piping, which carries sewage to treatment 
ponds before being discharged in to Starborough Creek.  The AC piping only had minor 
breaks following the Kaikōura earthquake, however there was concern that hairline 
fractures from the 2013 earthquakes would rupture completely as the piping had a similar 
strength to earthenware.  Some sewage was found to be leaking, however exfiltration and 
infiltration effects from earthquake damage are not covered by CDEM recovery funding 
rules so these could not be immediately dealt with.  As e. coli levels increased, coastal no-
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swimming signs were installed in several swimming areas as a cost-effective solution to 
maintain public health until the leaks were fixed.   
 
Ward has two community owned and operated water schemes, both of which were heavily 
damaged.  All the pump stations fell off their pedestals, and there were multiple breaks 
throughout the schemes.   A critical power pole fell over so no power was getting to the 
water network.  Roofs of tanks on the hill collapsed and most had cracked walls.  The 
earthquake had also caused major breaks in the pipeline to and through the town.  These 
outages highlighted the ethical dilemma of public resources being brought in to manage 
essentially private assets or leaving residents without water.  Two locals self-repaired the 
water schemes to partial effectiveness, prioritising this over even their own farms, however 
it would not be able to perform well under aftershocks or heavy rain events.  Most of these 
non-council schemes aren’t treated, which makes them especially susceptible to 
contamination.  Emergency water rations were distributed at the Ward town hall, and 
supervised showering facilities were installed nearby by the New Zealand Defence Force.  
Ward tanks that collapsed in the earthquake were eventually replaced with new plastic 
tanks purchased by MDC.  Most people in Ward relied on septic tanks for wastewater.   
 
3.3.3 Electricity Network 
The electrical network feeding our small towns is split into three main parts.  The 
transmission line, operated by the state-owned entity Transpower, transmits electricity 
from generation stations to grid exit points (GXPs) around the country.  From here, 
distribution networks run by private operators distribute power to homes and businesses.  
Marlborough and North Canterbury each have different distribution networks and 
operators.   
 
3.3.3.1 Hurunui 
For the first 48 hours following the Kaikōura earthquake infrastructure managers followed a 
‘find and fix’ mentality, patrolling lines and assessing if individual buildings were safe to 
energise.  This is essentially a business as usual approach as lines are often being patrolled, 
however now helicopters were assisting the search.  7000 customers were initially out of 
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power, dropping to 2000 within 24 hours and hundreds within 72 hours.  All customers were 
reconnected by Christmas 2018.   
 
Three Waters infrastructure and ‘sensitive loads’ (hospitals, etc) are typically first priority for 
re-establishing power.  Communications infrastructure is also a high priority for power 
restoration.  These priorities are interrupted by geographical or infrastructure co-
dependence constraints, where it would make little sense to simply wait for access to high 
priority infrastructure access when lower priority infrastructure is accessible and can have 
power restored.  There is also a priority hierarchy based on significance, for example 
Culverden lost power due to transformer failure at the substation feeding it, but lines 
feeding this substation and others were down elsewhere so it made little sense to fix the 
Culverden substation before the other lines.  Core infrastructure needs to be restored 
before others can even be brought back online.  Customers at end of the lines determine 
priority of specific infrastructure.  Critical buildings such as hospitals are included in this 
definition, however if the occupants are being evacuated long-term then building priority 
will drop.  It is important to note that hospitals and other such critical buildings are likely to 
have a diesel generator onsite in the event of power outages, however fuel supplies to 
support this will run out quickly if there is poor access to the building from blocked roads or 
building damage.  If there are no other competing priorities, restoration is selected based on 
numbers – half an hour’s work that restores 30 people will be preferred over half an hour’s 
work that restores 5 people.  Fulcrum GIS is used to track the status of assets. 
 
It is therefore critical to the decision-making process that accurate information on the status 
of infrastructure is being supplied to distributors, and that up-to-date records on customer 
use and distribution are available.  Communication was difficult with some areas, especially 
Kaikōura, inhibiting the transmission of information about the status of infrastructure – 
therefore delaying and/or impairing decision-making.  This increased the priority for 
restoring electricity to communications infrastructure, although some radio towers had 
battery backups available for short periods of electrical outages. 
 
Substations experienced little damage from the earthquake.  Most damage to the electrical 
network appeared to result from ground movement directly shifting and destabilising poles, 
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trees falling into conductors and landslides burying and pushing over poles.  Subsidence was 
a further hazard.  Access to infrastructure often proved challenging.  Authority is needed to 
enter property, while physical access can be impaired by livestock or obstacles.  Transport of 
materials and equipment are each important as well, however this can be difficult where 
road conditions are poor – notably the Inland Road to Kaikōura.  Pole infrastructure, while 
identified as a weakness in the network, is difficult to improve on.  Some modern, pre-
stressed concrete poles reportedly perform worse than simple wooden poles, and 
upgrading will pass costs on to the consumer.  It is cheaper to simply replace or restraighten 
poles after an earthquake than invest in resilience in this regard. 
 
3.3.3.2 Marlborough  
There are 25,000 customers across Marlborough network, extending south to Clarence and 
north to Havelock.  For Marlborough, the electricity network performed relatively well.  
Substations were tripped in Blenheim immediately following the earthquake, but were 
restored within an hour.  Most of the damage to the network was focused towards south 
and east Marlborough near Seddon and Ward.  Outages are tracked in real time using ESRI 
based GIS systems.  In the field, GPS tagging of network faults was accomplished via 
helicopters, which fed back into company GIS.  The initial assessment took three to four 
days, working outwards from substations along lines.  The biggest anticipated challenges 
were aftershocks, uncertain safety of infrastructure and human fatigue.  Much building 
resilience had already been informed by hazard scenario planning, including relocating 
substations, adding redundancies, installing devices to partition segments of network safely 
and establishing a private radio communications network.  New powerline infrastructure 
generally performed better than older infrastructure in the earthquake, however this is 
more due to differences in conductor materials.  As was the case in Hurunui, modern pole 
designs appear to increase earthquake resilience very little, and are very expensive.  Aging 
conductor infrastructure has been identified as a weakness in the infrastructure network. 
 
The emergency preparedness plan of the power utility, as in Hurunui, prioritises feeder 
restoration based on customers.  For example hospitals, CDEM sites and Council sites are 
considered very high priority.  There is a recognised need to plan for seasonal changes in 
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electricity usage, as winemaking and tourism are such a significant industry in Marlborough.  
This would increase the restoration priority for important industry facilities such as wineries.  
Holiday homes are given the same priority as other homes, even if unoccupied.  There is no 
guarantee of electricity however, as generation and long-distance transmission is reliant on 
the nationalised company Transpower.   Most customers were restored within a week.    
 
3.3.4 Communication Networks 
Telecommunication networks in North Canterbury and Marlborough consist of landline and 
wireless infrastructure.  The landline network connects local exchanges through both 
suspended and buried cables.  Most landline damage was associated with buried cables, 
which were stretched and twisted by transient ground motions (Giovinazzi, et al., 2017).  
The displacement of bridge components also contributed to warping damage, an example of 
compounding infrastructure impacts (Giovinazzi, et al., 2017).   
 
The wireless network consists of cell sites, radio/cellular towers and mobile switching 
centres (Giovinazzi, et al., 2017).  Many of these are dependent on landline infrastructure to 
feed data, notably national fibre networks.  Wireless mobile networks experienced outages 
in the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake largely due to power cuts (Giovinazzi, et al., 2017; Liu, et 
al., 2017) and while the wireless repeaters of independent radio communications were 
damaged by the earthquake, this did not disrupt communications in all instances 
(Giovinazzi, et al., 2017).  The Inland Road/Route 70 between Kaikōura and Waiau, following 
formerly underused roads, has been identified as a blind spot in the public communications 
network.  Access to the mobile 4G network here is severely limited, meaning that travellers 
lacking satellite devices are vulnerable to long-term isolation in the event of a vehicle 
accident or road blockage (Dangerfield, 2017).  Mobile network access was also limited 
along the alternative Christchurch to Picton route, which saw a sudden increase in both 
freight and visitor traffic following the earthquake (NZ Transport Agency, 2016; 
Wotherspoon, et al., 2018).   
 
CDEM and local government have a high reliance on radio communications to broadcast 
emergency information, but now that radio stations have become more centralised it has 
become difficult to broadcast after hours.  Many of these rural communities have very poor 
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radio communications capacity and often receive high-power broadcasts from outside the 
district.  In the United States it is mandatory for stations to be co-opted by emergency 
management, but this is not applicable in New Zealand.   Brian FM, an advertisement free 
radio station, offered to function like this so that Marlborough CDEM only have to ‘flick a 
switch’ to broadcast live information.  Brian FM have been improving their network across 
the region, planning to spread coverage into the Marlborough Sounds and along the East 
Coast.  Coverage as of December 2018 is depicted in Figure 3.6.  There is now a need for 
Marlborough CDEM to actively publicise that this will be the radio station with the earliest 
information broadcasts, as the music playlists cater to a more niche audience than popular 
stations.  Brian FM was the first station on-air after the Kaikōura earthquake.  Some 
broadcast sites had backup power generators, however following this earthquake AMI 
Insurance sponsored a generator for Brian FM’s main broadcast tower.   
 




There are some places in the Awatere Valley and a few islands in the Marlborough Sounds 
which lack radio coverage altogether, even during business as usual.  Mobile networks were 
unreliable following the earthquake, so satellite phones and VHF radios were used 
extensively for contact.  While broadcasted telecommunications were brought back online 
fairly quickly, it took much longer to repair underground cable telecommunication 
infrastructure.    
 
3.3.5 Critical facilities   
The Lake Grassmere Saltworks occupy one third of Lake Grassmere, just east of the Seddon 
township.  While one access road was damaged, the saltworks were accessible from 
multiple directions and it was not isolated.  This is a good example of network redundancy 
improving resilience.  In contrast, the nearby Marfell’s Beach Department of Conservation 
(DOC) campsite was closed for two years following the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake as the 
single access road was blocked by debris.  Access to the campsite was also affected 
following the 2013 Seddon earthquake. 
 
The boat ramp and crayfish processing factory in Ward are important facilities in the chain 
of production for the local fisheries industry.  The company which owns the factory and uses 
the boat ramp employs as many as 30 Ward residents, making it an important employer for 
the small town.  Uplift at Ward Beach rendered the boat ramp dangerous to use.  The rocky 
seabed there is significantly shallower now, and at the time of writing in January 2019, the 
crayfishing company still cannot launch boats as often as they could before the earthquake.  
There are ongoing discussions to move the site further north up the beach, however this has 
seen considerable opposition as the proposed launch site borders a marine reserve.  The 
processing plant was also damaged in the earthquake, leading to the disposal of stored 
crayfish.  Strong winds brought in by the 2016 November/December heavy rain events 
damaged vineyards.  While farmers are typically resilient enough to absorb the impacts of a 
bad year by preplanning for adverse weather, they will need assistance when multiple 
events occur across successive years. 
 
Each of the four case study towns have a school within their township.  Such small, rural 
area schools commonly need to teach multi-level classes with children of various age groups 
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– reflecting the low rural population serviced (Stockton, 2016).  Physical damage to schools 
was limited the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake.  Schools served as information dissemination 
facilities, with teachers promoted as official sources of news and recovery updates.  With 
usual communications channels shut down, parents are able to use school visits as a way to 
discuss their issues and “swap war stories” with other parents.  Schools can also be 
therapeutic for children, who can share their experiences with peers and leave the often 
stressful conditions of home.   
 
Community or town halls are an important focus for close knit rural towns.  These were 
impacted to varying degrees by the earthquake, depending on proximity to the earthquake 
and building materials, however even when damaged the location continued to be a 
meeting hub for the community.  Aid was often distributed from town halls, the land of 
which also played host to temporary facilities such as emergency shower blocks.  In cases 
such as Waiau, the town hall property was used as a site for temporary emergency 
accommodation soon after the earthquake.  In Ward, a makeshift welfare centre was set up 
at the local community hall, giving at least 22 people temporary shelter and access to 
supplies (Newton, 2016).  Some visitors to this welfare centre were tourists air-lifted from 




A typical farm hosts a homestead dwelling and several sheds and outbuildings for storing 
equipment, vehicles and stock.  Farmers tended to do work around their farms before 
attempting self-repair of their dwellings.  Township properties on the other hand are packed 
together in higher density blocks, usually consisting of a single dwelling in each lot.  Lower 
average incomes in these areas mean that new developments are uncommon in rural 
townships, leading to a high proportion of dwellings built under outdated earthquake 
standards.  Old brick-and-mortar buildings without the benefit of seismic retrofitting did not 
perform well, however modernised low-rise infrastructure only suffered minor damage as 
expected (Dizhur, et al., 2017).  An exception to this rule were the log cabins at Mt Lyford, 
which were top heavy and tended to shift off their foundations.  One such dwelling 
collapsed, resulting in death for an occupant.  Building codes for log dwellings specifically 
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have been improved in the wake of the earthquake.   The capacity for small towns to 
upgrade their buildings contributes to infrastructure resilience, and this is identified as an 
avenue for further research.   
 
3.3.7 Building Inspections 
There are stark contrasts in building inspection methodologies between the Marlborough 
and Hurunui districts identified in this thesis.  Different levels of government oversight, 
adoption of new technology and doctrine flexibility result in unique challenges and 
advantages for each building inspection team. 
 
3.3.6.1 Hurunui 
There were three phases to Hurunui building inspections: 
1. Rapid assessments: Establishing red zone, took one day 
2. Recovery: Inspecting buildings to placard, took three and a half weeks 
3. Post recovery: Placards expire, buildings reassessed and replaced with ‘dangerous 
and unsanitary notices (124 notices), took a further three and a half weeks 
Domestic access to lifeline services are investigated and recorded as part of an inspection.  
Technically the loss of water supply to a dwelling constitutes an ‘unsanitary or dangerous’ 
building. 
 
In Hurunui a ‘Red Zone’ was established, within which the majority of severe damage was 
thought to be contained.  Around 3500 commercial and residential buildings needed to be 
inspected within the Hurunui Red Zone, with a five-person inspection team, so additional 
inspectors were requested from Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group 
(Canterbury CDEM Group) – with limited success.  Neighbouring districts were prepared to 
send additional inspectors but could not without the Canterbury CDEM Group’s approval.  
There was a notable disparity between the 1500 qualified building inspectors nationwide 
and the CDEM Group’s inability to fill the district’s request for 40 additional inspectors, 




On the second day following the earthquake, Hurunui inspections began.  There was very 
little administrative preparedness.  Although GIS mapping was available for central 
organisation, electronic integration was limited with most inspection reports being 
submitted on paper.  Additional staff were hired to input this information into computers. 
The following placards were designated to buildings in the Hurunui District:  
• 74 red (unsafe),  
• 250 yellow (some rooms safe to occupy),  
• 3275 white (safe to occupy, not necessarily free from damage), 
• 96 other (cannot enter, cannot find or inspection refused).    
This placard colour scheme differs from that used in Christchurch and Marlborough in that 
green is substituted for white.  The reasoning behind this is that Green placards can give the 
impression that a residence is free from damage and does not require further attention.  Of 
the ‘other’, or lack-of-placarding category, one resident refused inspection for weeks until 
officials successfully negotiated with his lawyer.  The resident was fearful of being removed 
from his home should it have been allocated a red placard.   
 
Normally only 2000 inspections a year are carried out in Hurunui, so ‘normal’ non-
earthquake inspections and consents needed to be put on hold.  The frustrations of ‘normal’ 
consent and inspection clients were noted to grow over this time period, as only half of 
Hurunui District was experiencing emergency conditions.  Some interviewees suggested that 
three and a half weeks was deemed dangerously long to conduct inspections, as this meant 
some people were occupying potentially unsafe homes during aftershocks.   Most 
properties were accessible by road at some point in the three and a half weeks, however 
some still required access by helicopter.  To help ease living situations over this time, the 
inspection rules were modified to allow rural people to move out of damaged houses and 
into structurally sound sheds and other buildings on their property.  This was especially 
important for farmers who often have other dwelling options and needed to tend to stock 
on location.  A further distinction from Christchurch building inspections is that a welfare 
officer was not attached to each inspection team in the Hurunui inspections.  It was deemed 
impractical for welfare officers to stay behind at each dwelling for a short time to discuss 
options with residents, as there is significant distance between rural homesteads and thus 
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large travelling times.  Welfare forms were distributed by building inspectors instead, to be 
filled out and request further support if needed. Building inspectors also monitored and 
reported back welfare requirements. 
 
The workload of reassessing placarded buildings following the recovery period had not been 
planned for, again taking three and a half weeks.  At the time of interviewing (July 2018), 60 
buildings continued to hold 124 notices (not safe to enter).   
 
Culverden placards totalled four red and five yellow, while Waiau included 22 and 15 
respectively.  Most damage occurred from Culverden northwards, matching modelled and 
recorded ground motion intensity. 
 
3.3.6.2 Marlborough 
The vast majority of Marlborough’s rapid assessment was completed within 24 hours of the 
earthquake.  Most damage had been localised to the south eastern Marlborough area with 
the Kaikōura earthquake, which is a similar damage pattern to the previous 2013 Lake 
Grassmere and 2013 Seddon earthquakes.  There was typically more damage to 
heavyweight buildings, such as residential structures with brick cladding and commercial 
unreinforced masonry, with most properties south of Seddon experiencing medium to 
severe damage.  Many previously standing heavyweight buildings in south Marlborough 
were already removed following the 2013 Seddon and Lake Grassmere earthquakes, leading 
to fewer required assessments in 2016.  The Ward community hall experienced little 
damage in 2016 due to its lightweight timber construction.  Similarities exist between 
Christchurch and Marlborough in terms of areas with high liquefaction susceptibility.  This 
redirected MDC’s long-term plan for increased development from a southern focus to a 
northern focus following recent earthquake events.  Some isolated, unofficial red zone areas 
in south Marlborough have been identified, where building damage was significant but 
evacuation voluntary. 
 
The Rapid Response GIS system was software for use on handheld tablet computers that 
allowed responders to catalogue buildings visited and automatically upload additional 
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information to a central GIS repository, with a real time updated screen at headquarters.  
The software Survey 123 was implemented as part of this.  This electronic system worked 
well even without mobile internet signal, as the software would store data until 
communications could be restored again.  By the second day following the earthquake, 
rapid response teams were readied with target areas identified by the previous day’s rapid 
assessment.  Ward and Seddon building inspections were mostly completed within the first 
week.  Integrated GIS was invaluable in locating remote buildings across more rural areas of 
the district.  Digital placarding followed the Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment (MBIE) template, however as a declaration of emergency was not issued for 
Marlborough, the Building Act was still in power.  Placards are not typically used under the 
Building Act, yet a need for a placarding system was recognised – both for the benefit of 
response personnel and to reassure the public.  As of August 2018, MDC were engaged with 
MBIE to assist in the development of a system specifically for situations without a 
declaration of emergency.  This maintains local powers, allowing MDC to respond 
immediately without waiting for affirmation from CDEM.  While the undeclared system in 
place for the Kaikōura earthquake response had its advantages, there was reportedly some 
frustration from certain teams or groups that MBIE communication channels were limited.   
The biggest issue was communication on the go as many cellphone towers were disabled.  
inReach 2-way satellite communicators (text-based) are being bought for inspection teams 
to use in future emergency events.  They also have potential for general use in remote 
locations.   
 
Many rural properties operate on effluent systems, and as it was not immediately obvious if 
these systems had failed. Specialists were used to assess each system.  Many farmers 
needed to work on their farms, but the distance from temporary accommodation options in 
Blenheim or even local townships, and regulations about occupying alternative dwellings 
such as sheds and garages meant that their only practical option was to continue to live in 
damaged homes. Some parents stayed behind to work while other family members resided 
in Blenheim. In most cases however, families continued to live in broken homes.  Emergency 
housing was very limited, with only three units being relocated from Christchurch for use in 




The Building Act usually states that consents need to be processed within 20 days, however 
consents marked as building repairs were accelerated as soon as possible.  As in Hurunui, 
people were requesting normal consents during this time too, so the increased workload 
introduced new challenges.  There were discussions about what was able to be done under 
Schedule 1 (building works without consent) for residential and industry in order to facilitate 
quicker self-restoration of damaged infrastructure.  In response, building inspectors 
distributed booklets outlaying what people could do under schedule 1 maintenance and 
repairs – both for residential and business. 
 
Dam engineers needed to be sent to investigate if artificial dams needed dewatering as with 
the 2013 Seddon earthquake.  Landslide dams were also a cause for concern, resulting in 
some houses downstream being given a yellow placard due to limited access (i.e. only 
habitable during daylight hours), despite no structural damage.   One such dam cleared itself 
during the large rain events in November and December 2016.  The rain caused further 
problems in the days following the earthquake, with some placard status requiring revision.  
One such example was of a house marked habitable after the earthquake, but then 
downgraded to a red placard after being damaged by flooding.   Most placard 
reassessments were carried out on commercial buildings, however we do not have 
information for why this is the case. 
 
3.3.8 Interdependencies 
Broken bridges across North Canterbury and Marlborough represent pinchpoints for lifeline 
services (Palermo, et al., 2017), including but not limited to electrical distribution networks, 
fibre communication cables, water supply piping and transport in the form of roads, rail and 
pedestrian access.  For this reason, the strength of bridge infrastructure has significance 
across many different lifeline services, and thus is involved in the emergency planning of 
several sectors (Canterbury Lifeline Utilities Group Meeting 2018, North Canterbury Lifeline 
Utilities Group Meeting 2018). 
 
Culverden is considered a farming ‘hub’ for the Amuri Basin (Hurunui District Council, n.d. 
a).  As the traditional centre for business in the area, Culverden represents a critical link in 
the chain of production for rural industry in the Hurunui District (Hurunui District Council, 
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n.d. a).  As a nearby farming community, Waiau is very reliant on the maintenance of the 
main road link connecting to Culverden, which was heavily damaged by slips and surface 
rupture in the Kaikōura earthquake (Stuff, 2016).  As Culverden is host to the dairy 
distributor Fonterra’s only milk processing plant in Hurunui (Fonterra Limited, 2015), this 
increases the stakes for dairy farmers who must continue milking their herds throughout 
emergency response and recovery (Stuff, 2016).  Although Fonterra guaranteed to pay a 
base rate for milk which could not be transported, this milk still needed to be dumped which 
can cause environmental degradation and long-term issues for pastures.  With the rapid 
restoration of roads and bridges in Hurunui, Waiau and Culverden dairy farmers did not 
need to dump milk – unlike some dairy farmers along the Inland Road.  This is an example of 
interdependency between communities, facilitated by lifeline service infrastructure.   
 
SH1 south from Seddon became an important route for the transport of relief supplies and 
for lifeline management vehicles to access several east coast communities (Stuff, 2016).  
Being the only overland route from the Marlborough district, the closure of SH1 through 
gorge and gully pinchpoints in the hilly terrain north of Seddon represented a critical failure 
of the transport network.  As the timely reopening of this road through Seddon depended 
on local volunteer availability, Seddon may be considered a critical area for recovery upon 
which other settlements depend upon. 
 
3.4 Wider Discussion 
The built environment is only one facet in determining resilience.  Socioeconomic factors 
can equip communities for success or failure, and drive many of the secondary impacts to a 
community following lifeline service disruption. 
 
3.4.1 Socioeconomic Response 
We see similar socioeconomic stratification across each of our case study communities.  
Typically farmland is inhabited by wealthy families who run their rural business from home, 
whereas lower socioeconomic demographics are attracted to the cheaper property prices 
and rent of the townships.  A weaker financial position restricts options for recovery and 
developing resilience.  Lower incomes lead to reduced capital for building resilience within 
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the home or business – inevitably creating locations that are highly vulnerable to disruption.  
Such low investment in resilience was exacerbated by the earthquake as insurance was 
often poor, leading to small payments for recovery.  In the case of one family, the insurance 
payout was lower than the cost to simply reconnect utilities – let alone fund the 
reconstruction of their home.  Such low payouts were sometimes not used in rebuilding, 
instead being spent on debt or entertainment.  There were some reported cases of 
predatory pricing for tradesmen which did not help this situation, particularly in remote 
rural locations.  Poorer families who could not safely inhabit their homes would also need to 
commute for some time between jobs and temporary accommodation, whereas many 
farming families would have land and additional buildings for temporary habitation on their 
own property even when the main home was unsafe.  Farms are businesses, so despite 
higher capital in farming families, much of this is invested in maintaining industry in which 
failure has flow on effects for the wider community.  The most direct of these is the 
employment of township residents.  Well managed businesses weathered the earthquake 
well, however poor or delayed decisions lead to challenges.  Many businesses in coastal 
communities had unrealistic expectations for the arrival of tourists and supplies in the 
coming tourism season.  The idea that “some higher power” would solve their problems was 
common and for these reasons many did not make wise business decisions in the wake of 
the earthquake, electing instead to wait for instruction or consuming resources with a 
‘business as usual’ mindset.  These complex social issues are difficult to solve, however 
greater research into these dynamics may guide policy on improving empowerment in a fair 
way, without side-lining supposedly ‘advantaged’ people who are facing their own 
challenges. 
 
3.4.2 Phases of Mental Wellbeing 
We see a similar four-phase pattern of psychosocial recovery as described in Section 1.5 
repeated across our interviews.  It has been observed that the phases have no discrete 
transitions.  
 
Seddon experienced comparatively little physical damage following the Kaikōura earthquake 
compared to other towns, leading to a shorter recovery period and faster progression 
through the altruistic and optimistic phases of this model.  It is also believed by the experts 
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interviewed that exposure to previous recoveries, specifically the Seddon and Lake 
Grassmere earthquakes, gave experience which further accelerated this progression.  
Veterans of the Christchurch earthquakes who had relocated to the North Canterbury and 
Marlborough regions were especially impacted emotionally, which is consistent with other 
research into psychosocial responses to successive disaster events (Slovic, 2000).  In their 
own case study of the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake in China, Xu et al. (2000) attributes this 
to reduced self-perceived resilience in the face of future events.  Low self-perceived 
resilience hinders actual resilience as fear and hopelessness dominate, leading to rash or 
poorly informed decisions.  This can be a deciding factor in whether businesses fail, and can 
stunt household progression back into a sustainable lifestyle.  My thesis does not attempt to 
diagnose whether this rapid progression is due to realistic stoicism or conversely reduced 
emotional resilience among survivors, an aspect of post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
(Xu, et al., 2016), or a combination of these – this is outside the scope of my study.  I see this 
is an avenue for future comprehensive research in a similar vein to Xu et al. (2016).  It 
should be noted that some residents may skip or even regress to previous phases depending 
on their situation.    
 
3.4.3 Transient populations 
There was a very high number of tourists and itinerant farm workers in Marlborough at the 
time of the earthquake.  This was due to the summer tourist season, as well as the many 
vineyards in the area employing seasonal labourers.  While the international response to the 
earthquake was generally helpful, the understandable fixation of other countries on 
extracting their tourists and workers conflicted with the Coordinated Incident Management 
System (CIMS).  The CIMS model expects international assistance to be given to the 
governing authority, rather than a series of independent operations.   The prompt relocation 
of these transient populations did help earthquake response and recovery however, as this 
resulted in decreased resource use in sensitive areas.   
 
Many seasonal itinerant farm workers, immigrants and tourists speak limited English, and 
for this reason councils and transport organisations have been active in distributing 
emergency and travel advice in multiple languages.  Effective information dissemination is 
made increasingly difficult with rapidly changing demographics and few resources.  In 
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Culverden, as many as 25 different languages are now spoken.  Resources on the Kaikōura 
earthquake response and recovery were distributed in multiple languages, and labourers 
were encouraged to share information with each other and their families.  
 
3.5 Governance of Risk and Resilience 
Strong governance during earthquake response and recovery is critical for the long-term 
wellbeing of affected communities.  Opportunities for governance occur at the levels of 
national government, local authority and interpersonal relationships. 
 
3.5.1 Legislation  
Three key pieces of legislation were passed following the Kaikōura earthquake.  First was 
the Civil Defence Emergency Management 2016 Amendment Act, amending a month-old 
amendment of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, in order to bring 
forward certain provisions of the recent amendment for use in the Kaikōura earthquake 
(Brownlee, n.d. a).  These provisions supported a smooth transition between response and 
recovery phases, as well as establishing an authority to manage crown funding in civil 
defence emergencies.   The second of these was the Hurunui/Kaikōura Earthquakes 
Emergency Relief Act 2016, which relaxed certain resource constraints, facilitates 
emergency actions undertaken by rural landowners and empowers the repair of Kaikōura’s 
harbour (Brownlee, Hurunui/Kaikōura Earthquakes Emergency Relief Bill, n.d. b).   The third 
key piece of legislation was the Hurunui/Kaikōura Earthquakes Recovery Act 2016, 
officialising transition from response to recovery in the main areas affected by the 
earthquake (Brownlee, n.d. c).    
 
3.5.2 Clarence and Kekerengu Jurisdiction 
Clarence and Kekerengu are two especially small communities along SH1 north of Kaikōura, 
both under the jurisdiction of Kaikōura District Council (KDC) (Figure 3.7).  They were 
temporarily brought under the jurisdiction of MDC shortly after the earthquake. Ground 
access was inhibited from the rest of North Canterbury to these communities, whereas SH1 
was still traversable in the opposite direction back towards Marlborough.  MDC services 
were extended including the delivery and clearing of rubbish skips in each of the townships, 
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one of which was stationed at Clarence School.  Existing contacts between Clarence, 
Kekerengu and MDC helped to facilitate the relationship. 
 
The Clarence township has become well known since the earthquake, most notably as Glen 
Alton Bridge access has yet to be restored (Figure 3.7).  Residents and recovery personnel 
adapted to this disruption by fording a stream south of the crossing, however this option 
limits access to high-clearance 4WD vehicles and is frequently unusable in adverse weather 
conditions.  On 21 December 2018 Kaikōura District Council (KDC) announced that six 
replacement options for Glen Alton bridge have been evaluated (Kaikōura District Council, 
2018), however this complex issue has already left the future of Clarence residents in a state 
of uncertainty for two years.  With a significant rise in rates to fund the Kaikōura rebuild and 
long-term politics over regional governance, our interviewees report that there is sentiment 
in favour of returning to MDC jurisdiction permanently. 
 
3.5.3 Data management 
Inter-organisational sharing of information was inconsistent across the study area.  In many 
cases, red tape from commercial sensitivity and confidentiality kept councils from 
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Figure 3.7: Clarence and the east coast. 
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coordinating their efforts with infrastructure managers and government agencies.  This had 
an additional impact on community morale as homes would be visited several times by 
different organisations asking the same questions.   The lack of coordinated information 
sharing can lead to serious issues. For example, the Ministry of Social development was 
unable to share information about potentially high-risk or antisocial individuals, putting 
both doorknockers and those residents in potentially adverse situations.  The MDC adapted 
to this issue by asking residents to sign information consent forms, allowing MDC to request 
relevant information directly from other organisations.  A common database was 
subsequently set up for Marlborough organisations to facilitate sharing, although earlier 
establishment would save time and resources in future disasters.  
 
3.5.4 Engagement with communities 
As part of their efforts to encourage engagement with local communities, HDC mobilised a 
‘welfare campervan’.  This vehicle toured campsites and major public areas disseminating 
information, while giving residents an avenue to voice their concerns and request 
assistance.  While this initiative was useful for those who responded, participation was very 
limited. 
 
‘Support Navigator’ is a role developed by the Primary Health Organisation (PHO) with the 
broad remit to facilitate communication between rural communities and support 
organisations.  Up to ten navigators have been appointed across Marlborough, Kaikōura and 
Hurunui (South Island CDEM Conference, 2018; MCDEM, n.d.).  Support Navigators assist 
locals to access support programs for health and insurance while also giving the providers of 
these programs feedback on where and how to most effectively direct their efforts.  Many 
of these small rural communities are not only physically remote, but socially too, so this kind 
of outreach seeks to connect people with outside help through trusted members of the 
community.  For Kaikōura and Hurunui, the top four presenting issues were financial 
hardship, awaiting insurance scopes of work, a need for independent insurance advice and 
living in uninsured, damaged homes (MCDEM, n.d.).  For Marlborough, winter home heating 
and insurance were the main issues reported (MCDEM, n.d.).  These channels have also 
proven effective in disseminating information from the community through a trusted 




3.5.5 Naming of the earthquake 
As summarised in the literature review, many of those living outside of Kaikōura felt that 
they were being side-lined by the naming of the earthquake.   Media attention was 
interpreted as being directed towards Kaikōura and quickly stuck.  Renaming the 
earthquake in the popular consciousness quickly became impossible, and even attempts to 
reclaim it as the ‘North Canterbury Earthquake’ fail to represent all people within the extent 
of damage.  Similar sentiments surrounded the naming of the Seddon and Grassmere 
earthquakes as well, which again impacted more than just these specific namesake areas.  
Identifying the point at which naming conventions lose significance in supporting disaster 
recovery is outside the scope of this thesis, although this appears to affect morale and 
compliance among affected rural communities. 
 
3.5.6 Firefighting  
The Hurunui district had been experiencing a three year drought and despite the 
earthquake occurring near the start of the typical rural fire season, fire hazard in Hurunui 
was uncharacteristically low.  Two major rural fires occurred in North Canterbury in the 
summer of the earthquake; the February Port Hills fire in Christchurch and Hanmer Springs 
fires in March, 23km west from Waiau.  The Hanmer fire closed State Highway 7, the road 
linking Waiau and Culverden north to Hanmer Springs, blocking the main alternative route 
between Christchurch and Picton.  Although fires can be a common secondary hazard of 
earthquakes, likely through leakage of flammable substances or electrical arcing (FM Global, 
2015), neither of these fires were attributed to damage from the Kaikōura earthquake.   
 
There has been some concern that helicopters would not be so readily available for 
evacuation, reconnaissance and aid transport should wildfires occur alongside future 
earthquakes in the region.  As many volunteer firefighters also form volunteer civil defence 
groups, they would be pre-engaged in other emergency management responsibilities or vice 
versa depending on the timing of hazards. 
 
To supplement combating fire hazard in the future, seismogenic or otherwise, there is a 
mandatory requirement for every residence not connected to a reticulated water supply to 
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have installed either sprinklers equipped with a 7000 L water tank,  45,000 L water tank 
without sprinklers, or a third alternative option that must be negotiated with HDC and Fire 
and Emergency New Zealand [FENZ] (Hurunui District Council, n.d. b).  Alongside this 
intended use, these tanks potentially double as potable water sources for remote dwellings, 
improving resilience to drinking water supply issues.  While these dwellings are by definition 
not on a reticulated council water supply and thus not directly impacted by a loss of the 
service for drinking water, a large tank of safe drinking water lowers the need for 
supplementary deliveries – freeing up resources to be used elsewhere. 
 
 
3.6 Chapter Summary 
Chapter 3 assessed critical infrastructure impacts and adaptations in four small towns to 
answer the research objectives.  The four towns are split between two districts:  Culverden 
and Waiau are in Hurunui District, while Seddon and Ward are in Marlborough District.  
Seddon and Ward experienced large earthquakes previously in 2013 (Seddon and Lake 
Grassmere) which increased physical resilience in that many vulnerable buildings had been 
removed, replaced or strengthened prior to the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake. 
 
3.6.1 Roads  
- Largely blocked by landslides, damage from surface rupture and lateral spreading, 
power poles and electrical conductors.  Bridges were commonly pushed off their 
abutments.  These impacts isolated some small communities.   
- Clearing of roads soon after the earthquake assisted in rapidly reconnecting 
communities to important services and infrastructure repair teams and was assisted 
by the residents of some small towns.   
- Adoption of the Inland Road as a primary roading focus hastened restoration of 
access to Kaikōura by road.   
- Air travel was used to bypass damaged roads altogether.   
- The closure of coastal SH1 isolated several small rural communities, and the 
restoration of this route took significant time and effort.  This was improved with the 




3.6.2 Three waters 
- Damage across and within each of the towns varied significantly, tied strongly to soil 
types, interfaces between structures different types of schemes and funding 
mechanisms in different towns.  Potable water tanks also tended to fare poorly, 
however for more modern systems this was restricted to connective devices.   
- Issues with three waters service were less apparent in areas where private potable 
water tanks and sceptic are the norm.   
 
3.6.3 Electrical networks 
- Tilted poles, stretched conductors and damaged substations.   
- Some critical facilities have the capacity to switch to diesel generators during a 
power outage, however this limited by accessibility for deliveries of fuel.   
- GIS software was used extensively in managing the recovery of electrical grids.  
- Radio towers switched to batteries when the power was disrupted, which allows 
electrical infrastructure managers to be more flexible in prioritising restoration of 
the electrical network.   
 
3.6.4 Telecommunications 
- Lost service from the electrical grid, and buried cables were commonly stretched or 
severed by the earthquake.  Broadcast telecommunications typically have poor 
coverage between small rural towns, and is also subject to hill shadow from rugged 
terrain.  Temporary mobile signal boosters were installed along high priority routes 
such as the Inland Road.  Tighter partnerships between CDEM groups and local radio 
stations are being developed to help disseminate emergency information in future 
events.  
 
3.6.5 Critical facilities  
- While approaches to building inspections differed between the two districts, 
common challenges tied to remote populations and distance were encountered.  
Where these were overcome with integrated electronic systems efficiency was 
improved.  However, paper-based approaches were slow and personnel-heavy.  As 
69 
 
only parts of each district were damaged by the earthquake, business-as-usual 
consent and inspection requests were still coming through, which needed to be 
managed alongside emergency inspections.  
 
3.6.6 Interdependencies  
- Bridges were identified as significant pinchpoints for both roading and other critical 
infrastructure networks carried by bridge structures, such as telecommunications 
and water.  Where bridges were damaged by shifting off abutments, this also 
severed networks traversing bridge spans.   
- Some industries, such as dairy farming, rely on multiple communities in a production 
chain.  A facility in Culverden processed milk for the Hurunui District, however farms 
on the Inland Road were unable to access this and instead needed to dump milk.  
Commercial losses from the dumping of milk were repaid by dairy company Fonterra 
for applicable farms. 
 
Socioeconomic stratification was observed across our communities, with demographics 
summarised as low-income township residents and higher-income farming families.  
Finances were a determining factor for dwelling resilience and access to insurance for 
rebuilding.  Four phases of psychosocial recovery identified following the 2011 Christchurch 
earthquake were witnessed again in the 2013 Seddon, 2013 Lake Grassmere and 2016 
Kaikōura earthquakes.  The intensity of each phase and speed of progression may be 
affected by previous exposure to earthquakes, which is consistent with examples in other 
countries.  Tourist and itinerant workers were displaced by the earthquake, a situation 
complicated by language barriers and unsanctioned repatriation.   
 
Legislation was passed following the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake which successfully improved 
the flow of resources and personnel in response and recovery phases.  The temporary 
transfer of jurisdiction of small communities such as Kekerengu and Clarence from Kaikōura 
District to Marlborough district helped to alleviate administrative and infrastructural strain. 
 
Improved data management and community engagement helped to improve quality of life 
and ensure residents received the services they needed most.  New initiatives such as 
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community navigators were proven valuable in this regard.  Public perception of disasters 
and recovery management is identified as sensitive to media coverage, and this can have 








Chapter 4: Detailed assessment of impacts and 
adaptations following the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake 
in the rural town of Waiau, Hurunui District, New 
Zealand 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
While Chapter 3 approached findings broadly, looking at the differences and similarities 
between the towns, this chapter explores a specific small town from our study, Waiau, in 
greater detail (Figure 4.1).  For Chapter 4 a deeper reach into the data is required to truly 
fulfil our research objectives of investigating how critical infrastructure in small rural towns 
is impacted by an earthquake, and how the community and infrastructure operators 
respond to resulting losses in lifeline services through adaptation.  The built and social 
environments form the main focus, as national and district-wide governance of risk and 
resilience applicable to Waiau has been sufficiently explored in Chapter 3.  The built 
environment section is dominated by impacts and adaptations to critical infrastructure, 
important facilities and the services they support.  This is followed by a section on Social 
Environment attributes, notably local perception of risk and role of emergency and hazard 
management organisations.  This fulfils the thesis research objectives by thoroughly 
investigating impacts and adaptations within a small town with high relevance to recovery 
from the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake case study. 
 
Given time constraints, this was best restricted to a single town.  Although the town of 
Ward scored highest on the town selection matrix (Section 2.2), we obtained a large amount 
of input regarding Waiau from the interviews described in Chapter 2 (Section 2.5) and this 
became a more attractive option for in depth discussion.  The high exposure to strong 
ground motion, vital network chokepoints, proximity to the epicentre, fewer complications 
from previous recent earthquakes and general vulnerability of infrastructure contributed to 
heavy damage in Waiau.  In addition, Waiau’s location at the southern end of the Inland 
Road would understandably demand consideration when reflecting on recovery from the 
2016 Kaikōura earthquake.  I draw from Canterbury CDEM situational reports assist in 





4.2 Built Environment 
4.2.1 Roads 
Waiau township itself rests at the intersection between routes to and from Kaikōura and 
Hanmer Springs.  This position has encouraged the township to capitalise on the role of pit 
stop for travellers - hosting cafes, a hotel and tourist traps such as a museum.  Many roads 
branch out from the township to service the surrounding farmland, including a southern 
road which links Waiau with the nearby ‘farming hub’ of Culverden.  Land instability and 
broken bridges were the biggest threats to roads in Waiau, although actual road 
performance was similar across all the towns (see Section 3.2.1.1).  Unlike the other three 
townships however, all roads in and out of Waiau township rely on bridges.  Each of these 
suffered considerable damage in the earthquake, cutting off Waiau from heavy vehicles for 
several days.  This appears to have influenced the rate at which other infrastructure 
networks were repaired, notably the rural Waiau water scheme.  This is discussed further in 
Section 4.1.8.  





The Leader Road (Figure 4.2, a) from Waiau to Cheviot is typically one of the busiest roads in 
Hurunui District.  It connects Waiau to SH1 north of Cheviot.  Combined with Rotherham 
Road (Figure 4.2, d), Leader Road offers an alternative route to SH7 for travellers and freight 
coming from Kaikōura along the coastal SH1 or vice versa.  Leader Road was blocked by 
damage to the road from slips and surface rupture.  Six different work teams were restoring 
the road at once in order to reconnect this important route, which was at repeated risk of 
landslides and landslide dam failure.  Traffic between the coast and Waiau needed to be 
rerouted south to SH7 before travelling northward again, increasing travel times.  With SH1 
blocked however, the demand for Leader Road was significantly reduced. 
 
River Road (Figure 4.2, b) connects Waiau township to properties east of the Mason River.  
Off this road branches Leslie Hills Road (Figure 4.2, c), which in turn continues south east 
until it crosses the Waiau River upstream of the township.  An intersection following this 













Figure 4.2: Noteworthy Roads in Waiau. (a) Leader Road, (b) River Road, (c) Leslie Hills Road, (d) Rotherham Road/Route 70, (e) 
Waiau Bridge, (f) Inland Road/Route 70, (g) Inland Road Cordon, (h) Lyndon Road. 
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downed powerlines draped across the road, along with surface rupture and riverside 
subsidence.  Restoring these roads required a joint effort between road and electrical 
infrastructure repair crews, as road functionality was required for access to fix powerlines 
and roads could not be restored to full use until the powerlines were restored.  Road travel 
was hazardous and electricity to homes in the River Road/Leslie Hills area was lost during 
this time.  Lack of access along these roads, especially River Road, delayed repairs to 
Waiau’s rural water scheme. 
 
Rotherham Road/Route 70 (Figure 4.2, d) links Waiau to Culverden, another town in our 
study, south of the Waiau River.  It leaves Waiau township across the Waiau Bridge (Figure 
4.2, e), arguably the most important access route into Waiau from Christchurch.  Like Leslie 
Hills Road and River Road, Rotherham Road was blocked by fallen powerlines and surface 
rupture.  Waiau bridge encountered the same issues as many other bridges in the area, 
particularly shifting off abutments and slumping.   
 
The Inland Road/Route 70 (Figure 4.2, f) was previously known as State Highway 70 until 
low traffic numbers saw this status revoked.  There are some politics surrounding this road, 
which was left incompletely sealed when downgraded and responsibility was given to KDC 
and HDC in the early 1990s.  This shared road is important as it offers an alternative route to 
Kaikōura, instead of travelling along the coastal SH1, then SH7 and SH70 (Rotherham Road 
section) from Christchurch.  The Inland Road also connects remote Waiau farmers and 
communities such as Mt Lyford Village to the road network.  Slips from step road cuts and 
several bridge failures were the main earthquake impacts.  The Inland Road to Kaikōura had 
been initially cleared and opened by the end of the first day following the earthquake, only 
to be closed again when NZTA took over responsibility for the route from HDC.  The cordon 
used to control the road is marked in Figure 4.2.  This change in jurisdiction is because it 
gained regional (and arguably national) significance as the first overland route available into 
Kaikōura following the earthquake.  This also freed up HDC resources for repair and 




4.2.1.1 Inland Road Cordon 
Several problems emerged surrounding the operation of a NZTA cordon at the Waiau end of 
the Inland Road.  The cordon was set up very close to Waiau (Figure 4.2, g), with the 
intention to restrict usage of the road to infrastructure repair crews and relief vehicles on 
their way to Kaikōura.  Most existing damage and NZTA-proposed slip danger existed further 
north along the road near Mt Lyford.  The initial stretch of road then was considered safe by 
locals, some of whom lived along the Inland Road.  Many of these residents had left earlier 
in the day (15 November 2016) to get supplies from Waiau township but were denied entry 
past the newly established cordon on their return, all despite having families and pets 
waiting for them at home.  Farmers were under particular pressure as they were blocked 
from returning to their farms and livestock.  Meanwhile, military convoys and council 
vehicles visibly passed through.  Residents of the Inland Road became increasingly 
frustrated and vocal about the management of the cordon, which also impeded access for 
critical infrastructure managers and recovery equipment relocation at times.  Anecdotes 
spreading about locals traversing the road safely before the second closure, most 
prominently the Hurunui District Mayor, further undermined the advice of geotechnical 
engineers and the validity of the cordon in general.  As an unorthodox transport adaptation, 
an unofficial route to bypass the cordon over private farmland was developed by locals.  
This occurred outside the approval of HDC.  Although disregarding the regulatory framework 
in place, this adaptation did relieve pressure on both the cordon management and those 
living on the either side of the cordon in the Waiau area.  It has been suggested through 
interviews that cordon staff were not sufficiently trained or well informed on who they were 
allowed to let through the cordon, both in regard to locals and infrastructure repair teams.   
 
4.2.2 Potable water 
Waiau is supported by two water schemes (Figure 4.3), one for the township and one which 
services rural properties (within the rural study area in Figure 4.1).  Water is pumped from 
the Waiau river via a gallery bore1 (Figure 4.3, a), before being stored in a tank farm on a hill 
overlooking the township (Figure 4.3, b).  From here, it is transferred to the township.  The 
                                                     
1 An infiltration gallery is a device which harvests flowing groundwater, in this case attached to a borehole near 
the banks of the Waiau River. 
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rural scheme is 120 km long.  It is fed by a shallow bore (Figure 4.3, c) from the Waiau River, 
before being pumped to a main reservoir (Figure 3, d) for storage before distribution to 
private water tanks.  A very high pumping pressure is needed between the intake and 
reservoir as this section rises continuously for a horizontal distance of 4.5 km across boggy 
terrain (Figure 4.3, e).  Not all rural properties operate off this rural scheme due to factors 
such as distance, instead relying on alternative water supplies, mainly private water bores 
and tanks.  For the most part, both of these supplies are considered branched schemes, 
consisting of continuously subdividing pipelines from one point source.  This is different 
from many large city water schemes which are more circulatory.  Such branching is most 
vividly demonstrated in the Waiau rural scheme, which is very long while only being 
pumped from a single intake.  
 
At first daylight following the Kaikōura earthquake (14 November 2016), physical inspection 
of the water networks began.  Due to the road damage and blockages, quadbikes were used 
Figure 4.3: Water schemes of Waiau.  Primary map shows both the rural and township supplies together, whereas the inset 
shows the township. (a) Waiau River intake for the township supply, (b) tank farm for the township water supply, (c) Waiau 
















by inspectors to get around.  A depression as long as 20 m was sighted along one part of the 
rural scheme, indicating damage by the earthquake.  While some usable water remained in 
the rural scheme’s pipes and local storage on farms, the township water scheme was 
unusable immediately after the earthquake.  These cursory inspections would not be able to 
ascertain the true extent of damage to water infrastructure, so a district-wide boil notice 
was put into effect.   
 
Water infrastructure experts from Christchurch shared advice in restoring the Hurunui 
schemes.  However, the branching rural water supplies operate very differently to the more 
circulatory systems in urban areas.  It is a recognised vulnerability that losing such a 
relatively small section of pipe can result in a very wide area losing access to water in these 
rural schemes.  Some potable water was distributed by council personnel where needed 
using quadbikes, however most rural properties have rainwater tanks with at least a few 
days’ supply, providing a redundant supply and improving resilience. 
 
Prior to the earthquake flow meters were only present on facilities such as key pipe 
junctions, reservoirs and intakes, however the Kaikōura earthquake has highlighted the 
need for live flow information across the network.  Flow meter coverage is to be expanded 
over the next ten years to allow for more comprehensive live data across all water supply 
schemes in Hurunui District. This should improve leak detection and restoration times in the 
future. 
 
4.2.2.1 Town supply 
Chlorine was used to treat water potentially contaminated by broken pipes.   Previously, the 
supply was treated with UV rays before distribution (Hurunui District Council, 2009).  It was 
soon found that the township watermain (Figure 4.2, h; Figure 4.3, f) along Lyndon Street 
had been severed by the earthquake.  Leaks were found and repaired following an iterative 
process: 
- Turn water main on 
- Identify leak from water rising to surface 
- Turn water off 
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- Dig up the damaged section of pipe and fix 
- Repeat until no further leaks are identified 
A mobile chlorine treatment plant was incrementally moved ahead of branching water 
mains so that the rest of the town supply network could be treated and in use while the 
Lyndon Street section was repaired.   
 
The tank farm in Waiau town typically holds seven days of water, however the earthquake 
had twisted the tanks off their couplings, resulting in leaks, no stored water and no 
immediate storage capacity at the site.  Three of the 24 tanks were soon restored, two for 
storage and a third used for periodically backwashing the system.  Full tank farm 
infrastructure was restored within a week, however the land it occupies has since been 
declared unsafe due to land instability.  At the time of interviewing, the entire farm still 
needed to be relocated (towards the east) and continues to operate on reduced capacity.  It 
took three to four days to restore the entire Waiau township supply to usable condition.  
Waiau township no longer has a boil water notice, however chlorination continues. 
 
4.2.2.2 Rural supply 
An early priority in restoring the rural water scheme was to ensure transport of water from 
the river intake to the main reservoir.  This is because both the east and west distribution 
branches of the scheme are fed by this reservoir.  The lack of water reaching the reservoir 
implied significant leaks in the intake-reservoir section of pipe.  Initially, three diggers were 
used to uncover the pipeline buried in boggy soil, which made progress slow and difficult.  
The pipeline was made up of 6 m lengths of asbestos pipe.  These were originally installed in 
the 1960s.  Leaks were found to be most prevalent at the couplings between each 6 m 
segment, as the couplings were more fragile than the pipes themselves.  This is consistent 
with the findings of Hughes et al. (2017).  The process of digging up each coupling, repairing 
it and reburying it was considered an inefficient use of the resources available, particularly 
with such aging infrastructure.  To improve this, an order was made to a pipe manufacturer 
in Rangiora to custom-make replacement polyethylene pipes for the entire intake-reservoir 
section.  Usually such an order would take six weeks to prepare, however the manufacturer 
prioritised this production for the recovery effort – dispatching the first batch within four 
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days.   In the event that the intake-reservoir section could not be restored in time, the HDC 
planned for installing an additional gallery intake to siphon water from a stream close to the 
reservoir.  It took ten days to restore the rural water scheme to operational status.  A 
permanent boil water notice is in place for the rural water supply, which also undergoes 
MIOX2 treatment.  Access to much of the Waiau rural water scheme was limited by 
obstructions on River Road and Leslie Hills Road, and could not be repaired until road access 
was restored.  
 
Irrigation was a very low priority for farmers.  Watering livestock was a far more pressing 
need, highlighting the criticality of rural water schemes for more than just human drinking 
water.  To help alleviate this, firefighters collected and delivered water from local streams to 
farmers.  A further adaptation made by some farmers was to remove fences along streams, 
providing access for livestock, sometimes across neighbouring properties.  Given the 
circumstances, HDC made allowances for this normally illegal practice.   
 
4.2.3 Stormwater 
Most excess rainwater in Waiau either follows sub-surface drain infrastructure to the Waiau 
River or flows overland into swales before soaking into surrounding soil.  The Waiau River 
has flooded before, however it is typically well-controlled by stopbanks.   
 
An investigation into flooding in Waiau modelled that a 50 year average return interval (ARI) 
Waiau River flood event would be unlikely to breach the stopbanks, however the same ARI 
for an important tributary – the Mason River – will likely overflow through the township 
(Griffiths & Wild, Waiau River floodplain investigation, 2015).  The November-December 
2016 storms which caused significant issues for Marlborough had little impact here, 
however subsidence and erosion damage from the earthquake has potentially weakened 
Waiau River stopbanks.   
 
4.2.4 Sewage 
                                                     
2 MIOX, or mixed oxidant solution, is a method of electrolytic water sterilization utilising a solution of several 
oxidants, including chlorine dioxide, ozone, and peroxide among others  (Quick, et al., 1999) 
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Waiau residents are on septic tanks rather than a centralised sewage system.  There were 
no mass sewage outages, as failures were restricted to individual tanks.  This is in contrast to 
centralised sewer pipes breaking in the Christchurch earthquake, after which raw sewage 
would accumulate at the surface with liquefaction ejecta or drained into nearby rivers and 
lagoons (Giovinazzi, et al., 2011).  Canterbury CDEM Situational Reports suggest six cases of 
gastrointestinal disease, however it is not clear if this is due to water contamination from 
sewage, soil or some other source (Canterbury ECC Situation Report, 2016xxv). 
 
4.2.5 Telecommunications 
Waiau cell phone coverage was improved before the earthquake with the addition of a new 
mobile network tower in 2012.  The Waiau exchange is a local landline telephone exchange 
operating out of Waiau town.  Both mobile and landline telecommunications are supported 
by wired infrastructure. 
 
Despite the relatively new mobile tower, Waiau lost all cell phone coverage.  Radios 
therefore became crucial to communication between the council and CDEM volunteers. 
However, the location and use of the radios had not been effectively communicated in some 
cases.  Temporary boosters were put in place along the Inland Route to support response 
and recovery as there is usually very poor mobile signal (Herbert, et al., 2018).  Despite the 
demonstrated importance of the route for access to Kaikōura, there are no plans to install 
permanent coverage.   
 
While the landline exchange in Waiau was not damaged, lines connecting to it were.  These 
fibre cables were replaced on 16 November 2016, only two days after the earthquake after 
materials were transported in by helicopter (Giovinazzi, et al., 2017).  Bridge crossings have 
been identified as common weak points in the wired telecommunications network during 
the Kaikōura earthquake, as different relative movements between the bridge and cables 
mounted on land result in stretching and snapping of cables (Giovinazzi, et al., 2017). 
 
4.2.6 Electricity 
The transmission network in Hurunui runs north-south, bringing power to the Culverden 
grid exit point (GXP).  As mentioned in Section 3.3.3.1, this GXP feeds a sub-transmission line 
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which powers Kaikōura.  The Culverden GXP also feeds the distribution network that powers 
Waiau and much of Hurunui.  When the Culverden GXP and Culverden-Kaikōura line is down 
for maintenance, power is rerouted along a series of coastal sub-transmission lines from the 
Waipara GXP further south, northwards along SH1, ensuring supply for Waiau by cycling it 
back along the Inland Road (MainPower, 2017).        
 
The Culverden GXP failed in the earthquake.  Due to extensive damage across lines in 
northern Hurunui and Kaikōura, power could not be delivered from the Waipara GXP.  
Waiau and the Inland Road lost power immediately following the earthquake.  Significant 
damage was reported north of the Waiau River, with gradually less damage southward.  
Electricity poles tilted over towards roads in places due to foundation related damage from 
soil failure, notably across River Road near Waiau township.  The poles themselves were not 
typically damaged, with 85-90% of poles simply being stood back up, however drooping 
conductors can prove hazardous to people, machinery and livestock.  There were some 
reported cases of livestock dying following electrocution following the earthquake.  Around 
95% of customers district-wide were reconnected by the end of the week (18 November 
2016). 
 
While the Waiau township electricity network was restored within two days, rural areas 
were considered a low priority to repair due to the lower population numbers serviced.  It 
was estimated to take a long time to repair rural feeders, so the decision was made to delay 
this in favour of focusing on easier repairs to lines servicing towns.  This is further justified 
by the fact that there was little demand for power at the time in rural Waiau.  Irrigation is 
identified as a seasonally elevated power draw in rural areas.  A new digital tool was 
developed by the end of the second day to track which buildings had been visited and 
relivened, essential for maintaining efficiency.  Good coordination with the HDC building 
inspection team was critical, as relivening lines to damaged buildings is potentially 
dangerous.  
 
A non-functioning electrical grid was generally not an issue for the restoration of other 
services in Waiau as diesel generators and fuel supplied from farms were readily available.  
Downed powerlines were an obstacle to restoring certain roads, however.  Some farmers 
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and other business operators quickly acquired mobile generators if they did not own them 
already. For example,  Brenda’s Café, a township establishment, received a generator on 
loan from the HDC as access to food and drink was deemed important for response and 
recovery personnel.  Generators are the preferred back-up alternative, particularly on 
farms.  ‘Renewables’ such as solar have not had much uptake as a secondary power source 
in Waiau.  The cost is deemed to be inhibiting the uptake of solar equipment – both in initial 
cost and the long-term cost-benefit relationship.   
 
4.2.7 LOS for Roads and Water Over Time 
As part of the examination of interdependencies in Waiau, roads and water have been 
investigated further in a level of service (LOS) analysis.  This involves looking at changes and 
trends in level of service over time in Waiau for these specific lifeline services.  Roads and 
water were chosen for the high value of data retrieved about them from interviews and 
accessibility of shapefiles for integration as maps (Figure 4.4).  The Canterbury CDEM group 
situational reports for the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake also provided a high resolution of level 
of service data over time.  Details for each LOS map are given in Table 2, with daily data 
across several lifeline services offered in Appendix I.  Trends over time are plotted in Figures 
4.5 and 4.6.  A major intent of this LOS analysis was to try to observe known 
interdependencies arising out of this pair of lifeline services, notably that of road access 
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Figure 4.4: Waiau level of service timeline for roads and potable water schemes 13 
November 2016 to 5 December 2016 (pages 90-91 are in A3 landscape format). 
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Table 4.1: Narration of Level of Service maps (Figure 4.4) 
Time Roads Water 
T-1 Business as usual  
(13 November 2016, 
Figure 4.4 a, b) 
- Business as usual 
- Main roads leaving township 
are  
i. Rotherham Road (Route 
70 south to Rotherham, 
Culverden, SH7) 
ii. River Road (West to 
Leslie Hills Road) 
iii. Leslie Hills Road (West to 
SH7) 
iv. Leader Road (East to 
Cheviot, SH1) 
v. Inland Road (Route 70 
north to Kaikōura) 
vi. Lyndon Road 
 
Two independent water schemes 
servicing Waiau: 
i. Waiau township supply 
ii. Waiau rural supply 
 
T0 Immediately after 
earthquake (14 
November 2016, Figure 
4.4 c, d) 
- Most bridges intact but 
shifted off abutments –
pedestrian access possible 
- Leader Road blocked by slips, 
road damage 
- River Road blocked by road 
damage, riverside subsidence, 
downed powerlines 
- Rotherham Road blocked by 
road damage, downed 
powerlines 
 
- Both schemes shut down 
with extensive damage 
- Town supply tank farm tanks 
twisted off couplings so no 
storage capacity, upslope 
piping between water 
network and tanks damaged 
anyway so no exchange with 
town or intake would be 
possible 
 
T1 End of the first day  
(14 November 2016,  
Figure 4.4 e, f) 
- HDC (District) monitoring and 
investigating roads 
- Inland Road (Route 70) 
cleared and reopened 
 
- Both water supplies 
inspected 
- Repair crews dispatched, 
restoring and reconnecting 
the town water supply 
systematically.  Key issue is 
the Lyndon Road water main 
- No service in the rural supply 
- Boil notice in place district-
wide 
 
T2 End of the second day 
(15 November 2016, 
Figure 4.4 g, h) 
- NZ Transport Agency 
becomes responsible for 
Inland Route (Route 70), 
closed again 
- Township roads being dug up 
and blocked by vehicles 
repairing water mains, 
including along Lyndon Street 
 
- Electronic monitoring of 
water flow not available due 
to continued power outage 
- Partial water service for 
Waiau township as water 





T4 End of the fourth day 
(17 November 2016, 
Figure 4.4 i, j) 
- Waiau bridge usable in both 
directions with assistance of 
stop/go sign (light vehicles 
only, no towing) 
- Culverden-Waiau portion of 
Route 70 reopens 
- Essential 4WD vehicles now 
able to access remainder of 
Route 70 with new segments 
of track converting the route 
into the Kaikōura Emergency 
Access Route (KEAR), still 
closed to public, army cordon 
in place 
- Leader Road remains closed 
- 66% of bridges in district 
assessed 
 
- Residents and businesses 
advised to conserve water 
districtwide 
- Water supply network is 
restored in Waiau township 
- Water storage capacity 
improved at the tank farm 
- Boil notice still in place (lifted 
in most other townships) 
- Waiau rural supply is the only 
water scheme in the district 
not yet restored to working 
order 
 
T8 End of eighth day 
(21 November 2016, 
Figure 4.4 k, l) 
 
- All bridges open, some with 
restrictions 
- Leslie Hills Road cleared 
- Route 70/KEAR open to 
military and essential vehicles 
only.  Some locals are 
bypassing the cordon via 
temporary road on private 
property, interesting 
adaptation to a disruption in 
service that potentially 
impacts negatively on other 
operations and own safety 
- 50 kmph speed limit across 
district roads 
 
- Greater focus on restoring 
the Waiau rural scheme 
(river intake to reservoir, 
marked on map) 
- Pods of potable water 
distributed to rural residents 
- Reports of gastro bug 
sickness in Waiau (likely 
contaminated water, boil 
notice still in place) 
- Waiau town water storage 
volume fully restored, but 
continues to run at reduced 
capacity 
 
T15 End of the fifteenth 
day 
(28 November 2016, 
Figure 4.4 m, n) 
 
- Road and bridge status map 
made available online 
- Leader Road open to 
contractor and emergency 
vehicles, Leader river valley 
considered unsafe due to 
water levels behind landslide 
dam approaching limit 
- Conway River landslide dam 
burst, threatening the 
movement of vehicles on 
Route 70 
- All 258 bridges in district have 
been inspected 
- Route 70/KEAR closed 
intermittently due to 
weather, exchange of control 
from military back to NZTA 
intended in coming days. 
 
- A temporary intake in a 
nearby stream is installed to 
feed reservoir 
- New high-pressure pipe is 
rushed through production 
and installed in connection 
between river intake and 
reservoir 
- Rural scheme water not yet 
safe for people to drink but 
circulated for use in watering 
stock 
- 230000 L of stock water and 
potable water delivered per 





T22 End of the twenty-
second day 
(5 December 2016, 
Figure 4.4 o, p) 
 
- NZTA managing Route 
70/KEAR again, now allowing 
limited public access pending 
registration of road users.  
Alternating dates for light and 
heavy vehicles.  Some dates 
cancelled due to poor 
weather.   
-  Communications broke down 
between road contractors 
and residents regarding 
opportunities for driving the 
route 
 
- Most Waiau rural water 
scheme users have supply 
restored by this time   
- Boil water notice still in place 
for drinking water on both 



























Full service No service Official vehicles only Escorted convoy
Figure 4.5: Average roading level of service in the Waiau study area from 14th November 2016 until 5th December 2016.  
Marker line denotes time of the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake. 
Figure 4.6: Average reticulated water supply level of service in the Waiau study area from 14th November 2016 until 5th 




4.2.7.1 LOS Discussion 
Immediately following the earthquake, all roads in Waiau outside the township were 
damaged or blocked in some way.  By the end of the first day (14 November 2016), many 
side roads were cleared by locals and the Inland Road was reopened by HDC.  ‘No service’ 
LOS for roads increased on the day after the earthquake (15 November 2016) as the Inland 
Route was closed again by NZTA.  NZTA later reopens this road, but for approved vehicles 
only.  From 17 November the Inland Road cordon is operated by the military, who from the 
23 November escort vehicles by convoy to Kaikōura.  Control of the route returns to NZTA 
from the 5 December and is reopened to approved applicants.  As fallen powerlines are 
cleared from River Road and Leslie Hills Road, road LOS is restored to ‘full service’.  Roads do 
not reach 100% full service in these graphs as Leader Road continues under ‘official vehicles 
only’ status beyond the end date of this analysis (5 December 2016).  A gap in road LOS 
information was when exactly Leader Road returned to ‘full service’. 
 
Both water schemes were fully shut down due to damage.  A large proportion of rural 
residents regained service from the rural water scheme once the intake-to-reservoir section 
of piping was restored, and the vast majority of rural customers regained service gradually 
by 5 December.   The town supply was restored within four days (17 November 2016).  
Water does not reach ‘full service’ again in these graphs as the boil notice continued for 
Waiau’s water schemes past the end date of the analysis.  Waiau rural water supply 
continues to be under a permanent boil notice as of February 2019.   
 
Clearing River Road and Leslie Hills Road allowed heavy vehicles to access the intake-to-
reservoir pipe section of the rural water scheme for repairs, which is why rural water LOS 
appears to lag behind the LOS for River Road.  There is an eight day difference between the 
end of no service for River Road and the beginning of ‘stockwater only’ LOS for the rural 
water scheme.  This is consistent with the time taken to begin digging up the intake-
reservoir pipe section, manufacture and delivery of new piping, and restoration of the 
intake-reservoir pipe section described in Section 4.1.2.2.  From this point onwards, the 
remainder of the rural water scheme is gradually brought back online to a ‘stockwater only’ 
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standard.  Conversely, in the township scheme road service is lost along Lyndon Street as 
water mains are being repaired.  Here, the road LOS is instead dependent on the state of 
the water LOS. 
 
It is important to note that in Figures 4.5 and 4.6 transitions between days can be 
misleading, as each ‘day’ plotted in the charts is informed by the LOS at the end of the day 
in reality.  This obscures changes that occur throughout the day, as only LOS at the end of 
the day is shown.  Conversely, this also results in steep slopes where in fact changes were 
effectively instantaneous and not gradual, such as the transition from 13 November 2016 
into the 15 November 2016 in both charts which conceals not only the immediate LOS post-
earthquake, but also the rate at which loss of service occurred.  For day-to-day changes in 
LOS this is acceptable. 
 
4.2.8 Lifeline Sector Interdependence Matrices  
Interdependence between lifeline services is observed with regularity when reviewing 
lifeline performance in Waiau.  It is important to compare a business-as-usual state with an 
emergency state in order to build an understanding of emergent relationships between 
lifelines, which can change radically.  We can then use this to anticipate change and pre-
emptively forecast the most relied on lifelines during emergency conditions, thus improving 
resilience.  
 
The following service interdependence matrices (Table 4.3) are adapted from an example in 
New Zealand Lifelines Council (2017) to match Waiau’s specific circumstances.  Each table is 
accompanied by a justification for their results.  These results are an estimation based on 










1(Table 4.2) (a) 'Business as usual' and (b )Post-event lifeline sector interdependence matrices for Waiau  
3 = Required for service to function  
2 = Important for function or required in maintenance/other non-operative performance 
1 = Minimal or nil requirement  
 
a            
Degree to what this > 
Electricity Roads Fuel 
Wired 




Telecomms. Total Is dependent on this v 
Electricity   1 3 3 3 1 1 3 15 
Broadcast Telecomms. 2 2 2 2 2 2 3   15 
Roads 2   3 2 2 2 1 2 14 
Fuel 2 2   2 2 2 1 2 13 
Wired Telecomms. 2 1 2   2 1 1 2 11 
Stormwater and Drainage 1 2 1 1 2   1 1 9 
Water Supply 1 1 1 1   1 1 1 7 
Aviation 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 7 
Total 11 10 13 12 14 10 9 12 91 
b            
Degree to what this > 
Electricity Roads Fuel 
Wired 




Telecomms. Total Is dependent on this v 
Broadcast Telecomms. 3 3 3 3 3 3 3   21 
Roads 3   3 3 3 3 1 3 19 
Fuel 3 3   3 3 3 1 3 19 
Electricity   1 3 3 3 1 1 3 15 
Aviation 2 2 1 2 2 2  2 13 
Wired Telecomms. 2 1 2   2 1 1 2 11 
Stormwater and Drainage 1 2 1 1 2   1 1 9 
Water Supply 1 1 1 1   1 1 1 7 
Total 15 13 14 16 18 14 9 15 114 
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The following are simplified relationships for business-as-usual sector interdependence for 
before the earthquake (Table 4.3a): 
 
- The electrical grid relies on roads and fuel to support day to day maintenance, and a 
mix of wired and broadcasted telecommunications for general operation. 
 
- Roading requires the effective drainage of stormwater to keep drivable.  Fuel and 
broadcasted telecommunications are necessary for maintenance. 
 
- Transport of fuel relies heavily on roads.  The operation of commercial pumps and 
other related equipment is only possible with electricity, and there were few backup 
generators for fuel stations in Waiau.  Telecommunications are important for 
domestic purchasing of fuel and other day to day operations. 
 
- Wired telecommunications include both buried and pole mounted cables.  While 
copper-based wired telecommunication methods do not require the electrical grid to 
function, fibre and most receiving and transmitting devices do.  Roads, fuel and 
broadcast telecommunications are needed in maintenance. 
 
- The reticulated water supplies of Waiau need electricity to operate pumps.  
Telecommunications are critical for remote control and telemetry collection.  Roads, 
fuel and broadcasted telecommunications are needed in maintenance. 
 
- Waiau stormwater drainage only requires roads, fuel and broadcasted 
telecommunications during clearing and other rare maintenance. 
 
- Broadcasted telecommunications run on electricity, often with battery cells for a 
backup power source.  Roads, fuel and further broadcasted telecommunications are 
needed in the maintenance of transmitter towers. 
 





In the New Zealand Lifeline Council’s (2017) lifeline sector interdependency matrix, fuel 
becomes the most depended on service post-event.  This is followed by roads, and then 
telecommunications.  For Waiau specifically, we see broadcast telecommunications rise in 
criticality over roads and fuel, the latter of which now have the same score, reflecting a 
combination of different weighting based on observed needs and the reclassification of 
sectors in this adapted version.   
 
Broadcasted telecommunications were needed in every sector for effective coordination in 
recovery.  Roads and fuel were required to relocate and operate recovery equipment in all 
sectors considered.  Fuel was also used in numerous electricity generators where power was 
yet to be restored.  Electricity dependence does not appear to change, although the use of 
generators alleviates pressure on electricity-dependent sectors.  There are no further 
changes in interdependence shown in these matrices.  My findings generally support those 
of the NZ Lifelines Council Study (2017). 
 
The importance of aviation is moderately raised post event, as in Waiau there was some 
initial scouting by infrastructure managers to evaluate the extent of infrastructure damage.  
Usage of helicopters was otherwise limited to uncommon cargo transport such as the airlift 
of fibreoptic cables.  This is in contrast to Kaikōura where helicopters were used frequently 
for reconnaissance, as well as the transport of emergency response personnel and tourists. 
 
An argument could be made that services which rely on a fuel of sorts will inherit the 
dependencies of that fuel, however we assume here that the services are sufficiently 
disconnected, either by geography or through sufficient local fuel storage, so we may 
faithfully depict immediate needs.   
 
It should be noted that the values displayed here only represent surface concepts of 
interdependence and do little to describe the actual change in units of service needed in 
each sector.  For instance, the repair of critical infrastructure significantly increased the 
usage of roads by each sector. However, this matrix can only tell us that road access grew in 
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importance, not actual road usage in terms of travel times, traffic volumes, or tonnage 
moved.  
 
4.2.9 Special facilities 
Waiau possesses several socially important and historic buildings that were damaged in the 
earthquake (Figure 4.7). 
 
  The 107-year-old Waiau Lodge Hotel building and accompanying pub (Figure 4.7, c; Figure 
4.8) functioned as an important meeting place for locals before the earthquake.  It received 
a red placard following rapid assessment by HDC.  This building was not replaced with an 
alternative, the Waiau Tavern, for six months.  This restricted public gathering to more 
formal venues such as the school and later the town hall (Figure 4.7, d).  Once deemed 
structurally safe, the town hall was used as a recovery hub instead (see Section 4.2.4 for 











Figure 4.7: Annotated Waiau township. (a) High damage residential zone, (b) Waiau Recovery Village site, (c) 





The Cobb Cottage was built in the 1860s, and currently operates as a museum housing rural 
memorabilia (Figure 4.7, e; Figure 4.9).  The chimney collapsed with two walls partially 
collapsing, however the structure is generally intact (Radio NZ, 2018).  Exhibitions are now 
held in a wooden former Presbyterian church on the grounds.   
Figure 4.8: Waiau Lodge Hotel, Waiau (D Dizhur and M Giaretton, 2016). 





Figure 4.7, f (Figure 4.10) refers to the All Saints joint Anglican-Presbyterian church, which 
was also given a red placard for damage suffered in the earthquake.  While repairs are 
possible, it would cost an estimated $1.2 million with no insurance.  Until this spiritual 
centre of Waiau township is restored, church services operate out of the town hall. 
The two fuel stations in Waiau were unusable until electricity was restored to Waiau.  This is 
due to a common lack of investment in backup generators prior to the earthquake.  There 




Milking cows in rotating sheds is a common method for dairy farmers in New Zealand, 
however several of these specialised sheds were thrown off their bases or rendered 
unusable by lack of electricity.   Farmers shared milking facilities and diesel generators to 
make up for these.  Road access was restored soon enough that no milk needed to be 
dumped.  
Figure 4.10: All Saints Church, Waiau (D Dizhur and M Giaretton, 2016). 
96 
 
4.2.10 Residential Housing  
Many houses in the Hurunui district are old farmhouses which do not meet modern building 
codes.  Waiau township in particular is a very low socioeconomic area so new developments 
are uncommon.   
 
20% of placarded buildings in the Waiau area were assigned a red placard following the 
rapid assessment used in Hurunui (Section 3.2.6.1).  These houses are deemed 
uninhabitable due to damage, displacing residents.  Within the township and in the wider 
rural area, there were 22 red and 15 yellow placards.  Examples of damage include collapsed 
chimneys, buckled walls and collapsed ceilings.  One resident of a red placarded dwelling 
was found by inspectors carrying a hatchet out of fear of further collapse and burial. 
 
The township needed more housing assistance than farm residences – likely a combination 
of damage, money available for repairs and skills applicable in a recovery context.  There 
were also fewer alternative accommodation options available in the township, increasing 
urgency.  In contrast, the inhabitants of many farming dwellings had sheds or other 
buildings on their property that they could move into, following approval by building 
inspectors (Section 3.3.6.1) .  Most of the residential damage in Waiau township was 
confined to the area delineated in Figure 4.7 (a).  Residents’ perceptions of house damage 
were diverse: some over-estimated structural damage whereas others believed their houses 
were completely safe despite “falling over in places”.  General sentiment appeared to 
welcome professional guidance when houses were deemed safe to occupy as this assuaged 
fear, yet there was considerable resistance from residents when inspectors concluded 
houses were unfit for occupation.  This likely stems from denial from fear of displacement 
and the economic impact.  In terms of residential building damage, Waiau was reportedly 
the least resilient town in Hurunui District.   
 
Insurance cover in the town area was typically very low to match local house prices of 
$150,000-200,000.  However, few alternative houses were available to buy due to damage 
and to rebuild a new home from scratch would cost far more than what these insurance 
pay-outs offered.  There was significant concern for people choosing to live in damaged 
homes and spending the insurance money on non-essential commodities and debt.  A social 
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recovery team was established by HDC to help educate people on budgeting, insurance and 
the process of rebuilding.  Temporary accommodation was difficult to find, as rentals and 
motels had been taken up by non-local contractors and workmen in the recovery phase.  To 
help with this, HDC bought four prefabricated houses from the Minister for Housing and 
Development at $25,000 each, with payments deferred until the post-recovery phase.  
These houses were originally used in a 2011 Christchurch earthquake recovery village.  Land 
for the Waiau recovery village was purchased in the township from church property trustees 
at market rate, providing a central location for easy accessibility (Figure 4.7, b; Figure 4.11).  
It took one month to prepare the village and one month building it, with many locals 
providing labour for free or at a reduced rate. 
 
4.2.10.1 Use of Recovery Village 
Despite the attractive concept of a recovery village, uptake was very slow.  Two of the 
houses were left empty for the first six months, and only recently have they all been filled.  
It is believed that this is due to the late availability of the buildings, as by the time it was 
opened in July 2017 many displaced people had already found alternative accommodation.  
These included moving in with friends and relatives, or in some cases establishing 
themselves in their own garages and sheds.  A detracting factor of the recovery village is 
Figure 4.11: Waiau Recovery Village, Waiau (D McKibbin, 2018). 
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that its homes were offered at market rent, which displaced people may not have been able 
to afford alongside paying for reconstruction and supplies for their real home.  The village is 
likely to continue until mid 2019 or as needed. 
 
4.3 Other Emergency Management and Population 
Considerations 
4.3.1 Lifeline Utility Management 
Perception of acceptable risk is identified by the UNISDR (2017) as changing based on social, 
economic, technical and environmental conditions.  Political and cultural conditions are also 
strong drivers of acceptable risk (UNISDR, 2017).  The way that lifeline networks are 
managed in emergency situations are sometimes criticised by the public.  The Inland Road is 
a good example of residents who are happy to accept risks on an individual basis.  These 
decisions are weighed personally, where they only really need to account for themselves.  
This is very different from the more political perspective of managers, who need to consider 
the lives, wellbeing and assets of many.  Blocking access to the Inland Road was the easiest 
way to minimise people getting trapped or risk of fatalities in the area. 
 
Adequate consideration of acceptable risk and expert knowledge was reportedly not always 
employed in Waiau.  Residents quickly became frustrated when told they could not use the 
Inland Road, despite dangers communicated by officials.  Landslide risk was not readily 
observable as it was concentrated much further along the Inland Road, perhaps leading the 
public to underestimate danger and overestimate acceptable risk.  In contrast, landslide and 
slumping damage to more accessible, visible roads such as Leader Road appeared to spur 
greater caution.  Diminishing concern for earthquake hazards over time was also apparent, 
with some people reportedly becoming complacent.  It has gotten to the point where there 
are cases of those still rebuilding their homes or developing land actively trying to evade 
council regulations in favour of saving money.  Some interviewees suggest that these are 
not problems restricted to Waiau, but are characteristic of public perception of disaster risk 





4.3.2 Volunteer Civil Defence 
Volunteer Civil Defence teams in Hurunui are split into nine geographical sectors, each 
corresponding to major communities such as Mt Lyford, Hanmer Springs, Culverden and 
Amberley.  Due to limited resources and different needs, the teams are not standardised 
and are given the opportunity to decide for themselves what effort to contribute.  This 
freedom stems from a ‘you get what you put in’ practical ethic, intended to build resilience 
only as justified by the community.  Understandably attendance to training sessions was 
varied, with an average of two to three volunteers per geographical sector, of whom many 
were also volunteer fire fighters.  Pre-earthquake, Waiau meetings were organised however 
no volunteers would consistently attend.  This may have resulted in a somewhat 
undertrained, underprepared and overwhelmed volunteer team. 
 
A welfare team is supposed to be attached to each Hurunui sector team, operating out of 
sector posts, however there was no formal welfare team in place at the time of the 
earthquake.  This severely limited the scope within which the volunteer teams could 
function.  
 
Waiau School was used as a welfare post for the first week and a half before being 
transferred to the Town Hall, where it was transitioned into a recovery hub instead of a 
traditional ‘welfare centre’.  This choice was an adaptation informed by local needs. Two 
years on from the earthquake, Waiau has a team of eight civil defence volunteers, training 
monthly at the time interviews were conducted.   
 
4.3.3 Transient populations 
There was a very small transient population in Waiau at the time of the earthquake.  The 
township acts as more as a rest stop than a tourist destination, especially for those going to 
or returning from Lyford Village and Kaikōura via the Inland Road (Figure 4.2, f), or Hanmer 
Springs using nearby SH7.  As the earthquake occurred near midnight, the number of 
tourists travelling on the roads through Waiau was low.  While seasonal itinerant labourers 
do work in Hurunui, such work and accommodation is mainly sited outside Waiau.  For 
these reasons, transient populations were not a significant consideration during response 
and recovery in Waiau.  Temporary infrastructure workers and tradesmen arriving from out 
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of town increase demand for accommodation.  As Waiau is located both at the end of the 
Inland Road and close to the alternative Christchurch-Picton route, thoroughfare traffic may 




Chapter 4 approached the research questions in a more detailed manner, investigating a 
single town with greater depth than the four towns in chapter 3.  Waiau was selected for its 
location close to the epicentre of the earthquake, vital routes used in the recovery from the 
2016 Kaikōura earthquake and large amount of information gathered about it in interviews. 
 
4.4.1 Roads 
- Waiau is located at an intersection of important routes to Kaikōura, Christchurch and 
Hanmer Springs. 
- Roads in Waiau experienced hazards similar to roads elsewhere in North Canterbury, 
Kaikōura and Marlborough.  They were blocked by landslides, power poles and 
electrical conductors, and suffered damage from surface rupture and lateral 
spreading.  Bridges were commonly shaken off their abutments.   
- Locals helped to clear roads to give access to their homes. 
- Inland Road adopted as main route into Kaikōura in response to the closure of SH1. 
- Change in management of Inland Road from HDC to NZTA caused issues regarding 
residents’ access to homes and farms. 
- Unofficial detour was developed by locals to circumvent the Inland Road cordon. 
4.4.2 Three waters 
- Waiau was supported by two potable water schemes:  Waiau Rural and Waiau 
Township. 
- Township scheme was largely able to operate while repairs were carried out along 
the main road thanks to iterative restoration process and a mobile chlorination 
plant. 
- Town supply tank farm’s stored water rendered useless as shaking twisted tanks off 
couplings causing leaks. 
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- Branching rural water schemes encounter unique challenges which circulatory urban 
ones avoid. 
- Key failure of the Waiau rural water scheme occurred along the intake-reservoir 
section, which was the only business as usual intake in the scheme. 
- Replacement piping for the intake-reservoir section was rushed through production 
in response to support the recovery effort. 
- Permanent boil notice in place for the rural water scheme. 
- Stormwater drainage was not a significant issue for Waiau. 
- Waiau residents are on sceptic tanks rather than any centralised system, which 
boosts resilience as failures were limited to individual tanks. 
4.4.3 Telecommunications 
- Waiau lost all mobile phone coverage despite having a relatively new mobile phone 
tower. 
- Waiau landline exchange was not damaged, however cables connecting to it were. 
- There was a heavy reliance on VHF radio to make up for loss in service. 
4.4.4 Electrical networks 
- Kaikōura and Waiau distribution networks are fed from the same GXP in Culverden, 
which failed in the earthquake. 
- Pole performance similar to rest of North Canterbury, Kaikōura and Marlborough.  
Poles tilted, conductors stretched and tangled with trees or other objects. 
- Conductors drooping or lying on the ground are a significant hazard to machinery, 
people and livestock. 
- Waiau township restored within two days (16 November 2016). 
- 95% of customers restored by the end of the week (18 November 2016). 
- Electricity supply generally not an issue in restoring other critical infrastructure and 
lifeline services in Waiau as diesel generators were in common use. 
4.4.5 LOS analysis 
- Waiau rural water supply restoration dependent on road access for heavy machinery 
and replacement pipe delivery. 
- Waiau township road LOS regressed during repairs to the township water supply. 
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- Pre-earthquake LOS not restored for the rural water supply (permanent boil notice). 
- Interdependencies 
- Water schemes required road access before repairs could begin. 
- Fallen electrical conductors along River Road and Leslie Hills Road needed to be 
restored before the road beneath could be used. 
- Bridges carrying other infrastructure types such as landline telecommunication 
cables identified as pinch points for multiple networks. 
- Electricity scored as the most depended on of lifeline services in the business-as-
usual interdependency matrix. 
- Broadcast telecommunications scored as the most depended on of lifeline services in 
the emergency interdependency matrix. 
- Very little use of aircraft in Waiau compared to the rest of North Canterbury, 
Kaikōura and Marlborough. 
4.4.6 Special facilities 
- Several landmark buildings were damaged in the earthquake. 
- Schools played big part in disseminating information to families. 
- No milk was dumped in Waiau thanks to quick restoration of roads. 
4.4.7 Housing 
- Dwellings in Waiau are typically old buildings, especially in the township where new 
developments are uncommon due to socioeconomic status. 
- Insurance cover typically very low in the township to match income, however this 
resulted in greater hardship. 
- Waiau Recovery Village was useful for people who used it, however it was set up too 
late to help relieve many displaced families who had already moved on. 
4.4.8 Emergency Management 
- Levels of acceptable risk were different for Waiau residents and emergency 
personnel, leading to conflict and distrust. 
- Visibility of earthquake impacts and hazards influences perception of risk for locals. 
- Diminishing concern for hazards over time was identified. 
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- Waiau’s volunteer civil defence team has greater dedication following the 
earthquake. 
- Transient populations put pressure on temporary accommodation options in Waiau. 
- Waiau’s strategic location on important roads and other critical infrastructure 






















Chapter 5: Conclusions 
5.1 Overview 
This thesis investigated impacts to critical infrastructure and lifeline services from the 2016 
Kaikōura earthquake and how these affected people living in small rural towns.  Adaptations 
to the resulting disruption of service were also identified and evaluated.  This chapter will 
summarise key findings regarding impacts to infrastructure, lifeline service 
interdependencies, adaptations and limitations to this thesis.  Opportunities for future 
research are also identified. 
 
5.2 Summary of findings 
5.2.1 Key Impacts and Disruptions 
Understanding impacts to critical infrastructure networks and the resultant disruptions to 
lifeline service is a priority under the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction.  
Combining understandings of hazards, vulnerability, exposure and resilience allows 
researchers to determine disaster risk as proposed in the United Nations International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction’s (UNISDR) disaster risk formula (Section 1.2.1).  The 
following are some of the key impacts and disruptions identified in this investigation. 
• Roads were commonly blocked by landslides in gorge and coastal areas, often just 
outside small rural towns or along important routes such as SH1, physically isolating 
them from larger population centres that they rely on for goods and services. 
• Bridge spans were left largely intact, however many of these had been shaken off 
their abutments – damaging infrastructure carried by the bridge.  As infrastructure 
networks in rural areas tend to have few redundancies, failure at these pinch points 
can shut down large swathes of network. 
• Damage from shaking and ground deformation to three waters schemes was most 
apparent at fixtures between pipes and apparatuses such as water tanks or 
junctions.  Older tanks and piping were most vulnerable to damage. 
• The community operated water schemes of Ward required significant assistance 
from the Marlborough District Council (MDC), suggesting that both scheme 




• Electrical networks were widely impaired by poles tilted by shaking and ground 
deformation, stretching and breaking conductors.  Conductors were also broken by 
falling trees and landslides.  Critical facilities such as substations suffered damage 
from shaking. 
• Telecommunication capabilities were significantly reduced by loss of power to 
transmitting towers and landline exchanges.    
• Many buildings survived the 2016 Kaikōura earthquakes in Seddon and Ward due to 
earthquake strengthening prompted by the 2013 Seddon and Lake Grassmere 
earthquakes. 
• In the 2013 Seddon earthquake Seddon wastewater pipes running east-west were 
damaged, while pipes running north-south were relatively unharmed.  No such 
pattern was observed with the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake. 
 
5.2.2 Key Interdependencies 
An important part of this study was to identify the interaction of lifeline services as 
interdependencies.  Interacting lifelines produce complex relationships where the failure of 
one can have cascading impacts on others.  In rural settings, it can take some time to restore 
infrastructure so prioritisation is a must.  
• Under business as usual conditions in Waiau, the lifeline service most depended on 
by other lifelines is electricity, followed by broadcasted telecommunications and 
roads.  In emergency conditions post 2016 Kaikōura earthquake, broadcasted 
telecommunications becomes the most depended on followed by roads and fuel. 
• Broadcast telecommunications are required for the coordination and monitoring of 
every sector in recovery.   
• Roads facilitate not only the transport of supplies, but of infrastructure repair crews 
as well.  Heavy equipment requires road access to be restored before it can enter a 
given area and repair infrastructure.   
• Fallen conductors block roads.  Until these are cleared, it can be difficult for repair 
crews to fix other forms of infrastructure.  This appears to have contributed to the 
delay in restoring the Waiau rural water supply, which required excavators.   
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• While electricity services are required to run many other kinds of services, the 
majority of critical infrastructure nodes are equipped with some form of backup 
power source.  
• Reliance on aviation is considerably lower in Hurunui than in Kaikōura and 
Marlborough. 
 
5.2.3 Key Adaptations 
The adaptations observed in this investigation are particularly novel.  Some may have 
applications for other small rural towns facing similar circumstances after an earthquake.  
Adaptations reactively improve resilience as difficulties are encountered, however by 
documenting them in past events emergency management can prepare to support similar 
actions in the future, or even incorporate aspects into emergency planning.   
 
5.2.3.1 Transport 
The Inland Road cordon’s exclusivity created an artificial disruption of road service.   This 
prevented people from getting to their homes and livestock.  To avoid this, locals developed 
an unofficial detour over private land.  This enabled the restoration of local access, however 
it was problematic as people were ignoring emergency management’s warnings and 
potentially exposing themselves to danger, as well as using sections of road earmarked for 
infrastructure recovery vehicles and supply convoys.   
 
Without water delivered by the Waiau rural water scheme, farmers began to encounter 
difficulty watering their stock.   To alleviate this issue, they collectively removed fences near 
rivers and streams and allowed stock to drink from them.  Allowing stock to drink from 
waterways is usually illegal however the Hurunui District Council (HDC) waived this rule to 
support the wellbeing of farmers and their businesses. 
 
5.2.3.2 Electricity and Fuel 
Loss of electricity can be devastating for other lifelines services, industry and the community 
at large.  Rotating milk sheds in Waiau could not operate without power, for example.  
Diesel generators were the preferred electricity backup option for Waiau, as most farmers 
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already owned or could quickly purchase them.  Certain businesses and essential sites which 
could not source a generator were loaned one from HDC. 
 
A significant drawback of using generators is that fuel must be stockpiled, and then 
replenished, over time.  While fuel can be stockpiled easily on farms during business as 
normal this is not as easy for township residents, who have both less space and typically 
lower incomes.  When roads are blocked, isolated communities will have additional 
difficulty sourcing supplementary fuel.  Farmers shared their stockpiles of fuel while roads 
were blocked  
 
5.2.3.3 Emergency Housing 
Where people must vacate their homes due to building damage or access issues, suitable 
alternative accommodation must be found.  For small rural towns, alternative options 
following a disaster are severely limited as: 
- There are few undamaged local homes available on the market 
- Hotels, motels and hostels are booked up by recovery personnel, tradesmen and 
other displaced locals 
- Options in other towns demand long commutes or are impractical due to road 
closures and long detours  
- Displaced people may have difficult financial situations between being put out of 
work, rebuilding their homes or a poor BAU financial situation 
Emergency management and local government therefore can relieve significant 
socioeconomic pressure by providing temporary accommodation to displaced peoples.  
Lessons learned in the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake show however that sourcing and installing 
temporary accommodation is costly and takes a significant amount of time – eight months 
in the case of the Waiau Recovery Village (WRV).  HDC housing inspectors allowed farmers 
with red placarded homes to stay on their property when sheds and other buildings were of 
a habitable standard, helping to reduce the strain on resources in the township and letting 





Unreliable telecommunications and electricity exacerbate already difficult communication 
across rural areas.  Focal points such as pubs provide a meeting space where people can 
discuss their experiences and challenges with others, as well as share skills and consolation, 
in a comfortable setting.  The Waiau Lodge Hotel received a red placard, pushing such 
gatherings to the Waiau Town Hall.  As this did not fulfil informal requirements, popular 
demand saw a return to a temporary pub erected on the Waiau Lodge Hotel property.  In 
Ward, regular barbeques outside the Ward Town Hall filled this role.  Even infrastructure 
managers attended, allowing them to assuage concerns and better understand local 
priorities.  Sometimes these properties were host to multiple services at once, including 
emergency shower blocks, water distribution points and civil defence sector posts. 
 
Immediate economic resilience of residents and physical resilience of dwellings are 
demonstrably tied to economic disparity.  Farming families are typically resilient 
economically as well-planned businesses will be able to absorb some level of losses from 
disaster.  It is important to note however that several successive disasters in a short period 
of time will prove challenging.  Flexibility in allowing farmers to stay on their property is 
effective in that emergency resources are saved by not rehoming them, residents can 
continue to look after livestock and they can begin rebuilding on their own.  In comparison, 
low incomes in townships tend to leave residents in old, less resilient dwellings which they 
cannot afford to update.  Low incomes also result in low insurance payouts, reducing the 
options for lower socioeconomic classes to rebuild or relocate.  Many people in this 
situation moved onto the properties of friends and family in tents or garages, highlighting 
the importance of strong social bonds in a community. 
 
Small rural towns are often remote, which poses a challenge when residents need to access 
services such as healthcare or insurance.  People living in lower socioeconomic conditions 
may need extra assistance.  As it can be difficult for outsiders to earn the trust of close-knit 
rural towns, the DHB’s Navigator system is efficient.  A single person acts as a liaison 
between residents and services, passing information between them and giving advice on 
how to use services.  Community navigators have demonstrated that they can build rapport 
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with a community and deliver information that the DHB and emergency management can 
use for optimising their approaches. 
 
5.2.4 Limitations 
There were some challenges with acquiring geospatial data for maps.  Time constraints and 
commercial sensitivities restricted the publication of some datasets, hence why they have 
not been made available in the figures of this thesis.  Geographical datasets depicting rivers 
were surprisingly poor, with entire tributaries such as the Mason River being absent – 
requiring manual addition.  Some datasets needed to be updated or replaced entirely with 
the publication of new research over the course of the thesis. Often, there was a lack of 
ideal data covering the small towns investigated purely because previous studies have 
focused on larger urban centres like Kaikōura town. 
 
A major limitation with using interviews as a primary information source is that the human 
element complicates findings.  Accuracy in collected data is restricted to the expertise, 
experience and views of the interviewee, which must then be reinterpreted by the 
researcher.  In this thesis such issues were mitigated by seeking out experts and personnel 
who experienced the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake first hand.  The utmost care has also been 
taken to not misrepresent the interviewees in writing.   
 
The Canterbury earthquake sequence and 2013 Seddon/Lake Grassmere earthquakes 
affected the earthquake response of the small towns in this study.  The 2016 Kaikōura 
earthquake was not an unfamiliar event for many people, which may have skewed our 
findings in favour of resilience in small rural towns.  This is especially true for Seddon and 
Ward.  Despite this, the ability for communities to learn from previous earthquakes is a 
valuable observation to investigate. 
 
Another considerable difference between the towns in our study was that the 
November/December 2016 heavy rain events had little impact in Hurunui, despite 
escalating issues significantly for those in Marlborough.  The rain reactivated landslides and 
threatened homes still damaged by the earthquake.  Drainage and wastewater 
infrastructure was also put under strain, resulting in water contamination.  Compounding 
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hazards, while providing useful practical data, may potentially skew resilience data when 
some communities in a study are not affected by them.  As the rural South Island is made up 
of highly variable terrain, circumstances are likely to arise where given towns in a study will 
be subject to an inconsistent distribution of compounding hazard types and intensities. 
Despite geographical differences, the similar size and demographics of the towns enabled 
useful comparisons to be made.   
 
5.3 Opportunities for Future Research  
• With the proliferation of mobile devices in the past decade, we are seeing the 
adoption of new emergency management systems with near-instant communication 
between administrative bodies and the public.  Recent Information and 
Communication Technologies [ICTs] tested in New Zealand have included the 
Emergency Mobile Alert [EMA] system, where alerts can be broadcast directly to 
compatible devices during a crisis (MCDEM, 2017b). Person-to-person 
communication of real time issues following an event may be inhibited in a rural 
community, where problems such as distance and obstructions are not mitigated by 
population density (Gerald, 2016).  The EMA system was put into practice during ex-
tropical cyclone Gita in February 2018, where it was used to disseminate information 
detailing water management and safety concerns (Taranaki CDEM Group, 2018).  
The efficacy of these systems in events where telecommunication networks may be 
brought down temporarily is a possible avenue for future research.  
  
• Many residents along the Inland Road live on lifestyle blocks, and so do not neatly fit 
into the traditional township-farmer dichotomy.  This puts lifestyle block owners in a 
difficult situation, as they face challenges shared by both township and rural 
residents. This becomes an issue as rural support organisations tend to be focused 
more towards rural businesses, whereas organisations geared towards assisting 
township populations.  Investigation into adequate support for different levels of 




• The Inland Road cordon detour across private property, along with moving stock 
through public land to access water, are examples of flexible transport solutions that 
are successful in rural contexts.  They represent potential redundancies capable of 
relieving pressure on residents, emergency services and infrastructure repair crews 
where orthodox transport routes fail.  Identifying novel flexible transport solutions 
now for the benefit of emergency management may prove effective in rural areas 
where traditional redundancies are uncommon. 
 
• The four phases of psychosocial recovery noted throughout this thesis are applicable 
in many different disaster contexts.  Small rural towns are not necessarily unique in 
their needs, however access to support services is more difficult.  While 
economically more resilient than township residents, farmers could possibly benefit 
from better support availability in the long term as depression and monetary issues 
appear to become most apparent in the latter phases of recovery.  More specialist 
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